The purpose of this chapter is to examine which features of the three mainEnglish sentence-types make these sentence-types compatible with theperformance of (indirect) speech acts. I am mainly concerned with formalapproaches to indirect communication and I focus on the semantics ofimperatives, the semantics of interrogatives and that of declaratives.

In this chapter, I present the notion of an indirect speech act originatingin Searle's classic speech act theory and I discuss how other accounts inthe field of philosophy of language have revisited this notion.

Aristotle identifies perception as central to all animals, enabling them to fulfill their ends. His biological works clarify his hylomorphic account of perception as a key activity of the soul by providing detailed overviews of types of perception and perceptual organs. Like other bodily organs, these have complex structures comprised of physical components, often in layers, all ultimately involving the four basic elements. I defend a compromise position on scholarly controversies about whether Aristotle can successfully provide a physicalist account of perception. Briefly, the answer is “yes and no.” His biological works, along with “chemical” works, do give physical accounts of perceptible features like colors and tastes, as well as of the organs (and parts) capable of registering them. However, because of his teleological views about nature, such accounts must be “top-down” and are never purely reductive or translatable into structural accounts like those of the atomists. Finally, we must remember that perception is crucial to the behavioral success of the animal as a whole within its environment. Perceptual “experience” in our modern sense does not occur in any organ but rather in the body as a whole, and more centrally in the heart and blood vessels.