A current critique in international investment law is the presumed lack of democratic legitimacy: Investment tribunals exercise public authority and take indirect influence on public law-making. Awards might create a ‘regulatory chill’ on the respondent’s parliament in enacting legislation; the adjudicatory powers of investment tribunals might affect policy options and thereby democratic space. This contribution highlights different aspects to improve the legitimacy of international investment law. The need for legitimization refers to persons and institutions as well as to measures adopted by these persons or institutions. All of this results in different reference points of democratic legitimization which are examined separately: international investment agreements; investment contracts especially with stabilization clauses; adjudicators as well as tribunal’s powers and decisions adopted; appointment procedures of arbitrators; the consent to arbitration as well as the determination of the applicable law are generally based on agreements or contracts - these requiring inter alia democratic legitimization. Moreover, in the ongoing reform debate a further institutionalization of investment law, the appointment of permanent judges, a concretization of protection standards, a higher personal legitimization to counter a lack of material legitimacy are discussed.

This chapter outlines a possible explanation for the overall stability of the Israeli regime based on the concept of state capacity, namely, the ability of the state to use coercive and administrative capabilities to “get things done.” It therefore emphasizes the role of the state itself in explaining the regime. The first section provides a short conceptual clarification of the concept of state capacity and its relationship with regime stability. This is followed by a presentation of the historical origins of Israeli state capacity and some measures of its capacity. The main part of this chapter discusses the ways in which state capacity sustains the regime’s stability in light of three challenges: the internal aspect of the conflict, the challenge to state authority from political tensions among its Jewish citizens, and the ways in which the zones of control have shifted according to the limited ability of state capacity to ensure direct control of the entire Occupied Territories.

This chapter begins with a consideration of concubines, that is, women who had a recognized status as social and sexual partners but were not wives, in the Roman empire and early medieval Europe. As the Church exerted stricter control of lay family arrangements, royal concubinage tended to disappear, to be replaced by purely informal, if often powerful, royal mistresses, mainly drawn from the aristocracy. The kings of Castile were notable for their long-term mistresses, whose children were often of political importance. Bastard sons were usually, but not always, excluded from succession to the throne. Examples of those who did become kings are discussed, including Tancred of Sicily, Henry of Trastámara and John of Avis, king of Portugal. Bastard children of rulers were often publicly recognized, and sometimes culturally identifiable through their names or coats-of-arms. There is a full discussion of the way illegitimate children could be legitimized.