A once-dominant family of interpretations of the beginnings of Japanese and Russian development claimed that policies adopted by the two states were inadequate to modernize agrarian property relations, and so both states were required to mediate between premodern agriculture and “hot-house” modern industry. More recent accounts have insisted that despite the limited reforms to agrarian property relations, agriculture in both countries in fact dynamically participated in economic development. This paper contends that these revised accounts’ one-sided focus on market opportunities leaves unresolved key puzzles. Why did productivity growth jump higher after the Meiji reforms in Japan? Why did only some regions participate in agricultural development in Russia? To answer these questions, this paper argues it is necessary to return attention to the ways agrarian property relations did and did not change following reforms adopted by the two states in the 1860s and 1870s. The key theoretical upshot of this analysis is that the initiation of capitalist development required a political process in which institutions that had previously guaranteed non-market access of rural households to subsistence were dismantled in favor of the domination of market relations.

This article takes issue with the common view that the early Turkish Republic (1920-1940) followed a “special” route to modernity characterized by “state capitalism.” It argues that such a view, rooted in the Sonderweg paradigm, obscures the historical-comparative specificity of Turkish state formation, leading to problematic conclusions about the character of Turkish modernization. Based on insights derived from Karl Polanyi’s notion of “economistic fallacy” and Political Marxism’s conception of capitalism, I offer a new interpretation of the early Republican project in Turkey, which, in turn, provides a deeper understanding of the social content, tempo and multi-linearity of world historical development.

In the last decade, few countries have figured prominently as cases of late-late developers that achieved worldwide success with their Information Technology (IT) industries. This paper focuses on the Israeli case and argues that uniquely in that group, and in contradiction to the model proposed by late development theories, Israel's competitive advantage in the IT industries, is in Research and Development (R&D). The paper's main arguments are that (a) the declared aim of Israel's industrial policy has been to develop a “science-based” industrial system similar to what we see in Israel today; (b) however, these policies, focused on diffusion and not on creation of capabilities, were successful only because of the existence of an already sophisticated and extensive R&D capability in the universities – markedly different from other Newly Industrialized Countries. Looking at the present the paper concludes that the same operational model that led Israel's IT industry to success might now be undermining its future growth.

Was nineteenth-century Japan an example of finance-led growth? Using a new panel data set of firms from the Meiji period (1868–1912), this article tests whether financial sector development influenced extensive firm activity across industries and locations. Results from a two-stage least squares first difference model suggest that financial intermediation is associated with additional net firm establishment, particularly in light manufacturing sectors like textiles. The overall effect is muted in the latter part of the period and among peripheral regions, which may underscore the respective roles of institutions and agglomeration economies in later stages of development.