I provide a new analytical framework to understand the effectiveness of corruption prosecutions in the so-called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) operation by showing how this operation was rooted in a populist interpretation of criminal rules and criminal procedure. The Clean Hands operation represented a successful breakthrough against the vast and complex corruption system that had sustained Italian politics for decades. I show that prosecutors in the Clean Hands operation interpreted legal rules through the lens of a deep-seated hostility between a vague conglomerate of “corrupt elites” and “virtuous citizens.” This populist interpretation of criminal and procedural rules introduced significant legal innovations that empowered judicial actors against systemic corruption by creating unprecedented incentives for defendants to cooperate with legal authorities. Consequently, the judicial professionals leading the Clean Hands operation also felt the need to shield themselves against retaliation for the use of these novel approaches to corruption prosecution by bringing their fight before the court of public opinion. To this end, the Clean Hands prosecutors made use of targeted media interventions to rally public support around their investigation and protect their work from political interference.

The Hungarian judiciary has reacted to the political change of recent years in a twofold way. Some judges have resisted political pressure and decided cases according to the law and their conscience, while others, showing the signs of judicial populism, have deferred to the interests of the government. The paper explains the relationship between this twofold behavior and the bureaucratic tradition of the Hungarian justice system. The conclusion is that the bureaucratic model of organization has certain features that can make judges more resistant to political pressure, while other elements of the model can lead to judicial deference. Nonetheless, these latter elements are not necessary components of the ‘Weberian’ justice system.