This chapter explains why the norm against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment dramatically expanded in the period after 1998. Relying on the theoretical framework, it assesses the conditions that made the Court audacious enough to effectuate these resource-intensive positive obligations. First, as a full-time court with compulsory jurisdiction, the new Court came to enjoy a wide discretionary space. This attribute conferred it with judicial courage to issue audacious rulings across the board and recognize a range of important positive obligations under Article 3. Second, there was a growing need for positive obligations in European societies, especially in the aftermath of the Eastward enlargement. Positive obligations were necessary for both the Western and Eastern European countries alike. They served a supplementary role for the protection of rights in Western Europe and played a crucial role in inducting Eastern Europe into a rule of law tradition. Last but not least, creating positive obligations was less likely to raise eyebrows because they were already established in the jurisprudence of other courts and were actively promoted by civil society groups.

This chapter examines the life and contributions of Singapore's Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong as a towering judge. Chan’s imprint on Singapore public law goes beyond his jurisprudential contributions and extends to fostering a mindset shift that has led to a reformed image of public law litigation as a professional and legitimate endeavour, and not simply a political and politicised activity. In presenting Chan as a towering judge, we conceptualise ‘towering’ as a relative and contextualised idea. Chan towers not only because he is one of the best legal minds in Singapore, and is more committed and diligent than most, but also because he was able to navigate what would be considered a limited policy space in a dominant-party state. Accordingly, although his jurisprudence may be described as minimalist in some quarters, we present his judicial minimalism not as judicial conservatism but as judicial courage.