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1 results

  • 7 - The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem

  • Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
  • Book:
    Reconstructing the Corporation
    Published online:
    18 February 2021
    Print publication:
    11 March 2021, pp 103-121

  • Summary

    This chapter critically examines the argument that Arrow’s theorem supports giving the corporate vote to shareholders alone. We begin by laying out the argument and distinguish it from two, related arguments: the argument from politics and the argument for absolute delegation. We then show that the Arrow’s theorem argument is flawed on many fronts. Shareholder preferences are not, as supposed, homogeneous. Even if they were homogeneous, they would not translate into the kind of agreement on board candidates necessary to avoid intransitive corporate election results. Finally, restricting voting rights to shareholders gives up a fundamental condition of democracy in a situation where the likelihood and impact of intransitive results are already negligible.