Religious freedom is protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Historically, the right has been understood in individual terms, though the courts have acknowledged a collective dimension to religion as expressed in a community of believers. Yet, the precise meaning of collective religious freedom has not been fully fleshed out. The current case law only encompasses a limited range of forms of collective religious expression and does not articulate a coherent theory as to why some collective 2(a) claims succeed while others fail. This paper draws on concepts from interpretive sociology to help clarify the existing jurisprudence and reveal a tension that is otherwise invisible over the status of volition/voluntariness in the collective religious freedom framework. Addressing this tension can help rationalize the Court’s jurisprudence and give resources to critics looking to change how the law encompasses collective religious experience.

Alfred Schutz argues that social scientists should interpret social life from the standpoint of the subjective meanings of ordinary actors, while themselves maintaining a detached, ‘objectifying’ attitude. This defence of the objectifying stance in social research has been criticised by some commentators, notably by Jürgen Habermas, on the grounds that it contradicts the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity and interpretive participation from which Schutz sets out. Habermas in particular argues that validity in social science consists in the pursuit of normative dialogue between researchers and laypeople with a view to ‘consensus’ over beliefs and values. This article disputes any such charge of inconsistency in Schutz by arguing that while social-scientific knowledge may originate from communication in the lifeworld, it cannot itself involve a ‘communicative’ or ‘dialogical’ attitude to the subjects of research.