Chapter 5 investigates mental modularity, which is a central concept in the study of minds, i.e., the notion of mental module which, in this context, refers to a specific, specialized domain-specific mental capacity (such as for language, for vision, for music, etc.). A given module may contain several submodules. We will look at the history of this concept and how it has been understood in different approaches, such as the outdated pseudoscience phrenology, the philosopher Jerry Fodor’s nine criteria for proper modules, massive modularity in evolutionary psychology, and other views. Once modules are postulated, we can ask, separately for each module, about the interplay between nature and nurture: Different outcomes are possible for different modules. Finally, we discuss the notion of ontogenetic, developmental modules.

This chapter is about the category of innateness, which is a feature often associated with a range of cognitive phenomena, including concepts, cognitive capacities, behavioral dispositions, and mental states. Arguing against a number of recent critiques of the notion, this chapter tries to show that innateness can be identified with a cluster of properties that are causally interrelated in various ways and proposes a tentative causal model of the kind. In individuating innateness, it is important to distinguish proximal from distal causation. Some of the causal properties associated with innateness are involved in individuating innate cognitive capacities synchronically, while others are etiological in nature, responsible for making those capacities innate in the first place. This complex causal network is robust enough to warrant considering innateness to be a real kind as used in contemporary cognitive science.