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3 results

Bayesianism and Scientific Reasoning

Bayesianism and Scientific Reasoning
  • Jonah N. Schupbach
  • Published online:
    21 January 2022
    Print publication:
    31 March 2022
  • This Element explores the Bayesian approach to the logic and epistemology of scientific reasoning. Section 1 introduces the probability calculus as an appealing generalization of classical logic for uncertain reasoning. Section 2 explores some of the vast terrain of Bayesian epistemology. Three epistemological postulates suggested by Thomas Bayes in his seminal work guide the exploration. This section discusses modern developments and defenses of these postulates as well as some important criticisms and complications that lie in wait for the Bayesian epistemologist. Section 3 applies the formal tools and principles of the first two sections to a handful of topics in the epistemology of scientific reasoning: confirmation, explanatory reasoning, evidential diversity and robustness analysis, hypothesis competition, and Ockham's Razor.

  • ON THE TRUTH-CONVERGENCE OF OPEN-MINDED BAYESIANISM

  • Part of
  • TOM F. STERKENBURG, RIANNE DE HEIDE
  • Journal:
    The Review of Symbolic Logic / Volume 15 / Issue 1 / March 2022
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 February 2021, pp. 64-100
    Print publication:
    March 2022
    • Article
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      • Open access
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  • Wenmackers and Romeijn [38] formalize ideas going back to Shimony [33] and Putnam [28] into an open-minded Bayesian inductive logic, that can dynamically incorporate statistical hypotheses proposed in the course of the learning process. In this paper, we show that Wenmackers and Romeijn’s proposal does not preserve the classical Bayesian consistency guarantee of merger with the true hypothesis. We diagnose the problem, and offer a forward-looking open-minded Bayesians that does preserve a version of this guarantee.