Indirect regime change is, in principle, forbidden under international law because it affects the heart of a state’s domaine réservé. The inducement of oppositional TG aims at indirectly reconfiguring the constitutional order of the target state through TG. Applied as a coercive unilateral measure, it is hard to sustain that this practice complies with the principle of non-intervention. This conclusion suffers a theoretical and rather improbable exception: the scenario of constitutional texts explicitly and directly validating ius cogens violations. Another exception, which could become less theoretical, is when the UNSC induces an oppositional transition under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or authorises states to do so as a way to cope with a threat to or breach of international peace and security. In such cases, the UNSC could only empower an oppositional TA after a conscientious assessment of the TA’s compliance with ius in interregno.

Coercively inducing oppositional TG so as to trigger a regime change is in principle prohibited under international law. Does this hold true in the most extreme circumstances, i.e. when the incumbent power violates ius cogens? If states wish to halt gross and persistent breaches of ius cogens, they must exhaust the available multilateral fora and respond through collective non-recognition; multilateral cooperation; and peaceful settlement including by directly negotiating with the ius-cogens-violating regime committing these breaches. If these steps fail, international law does not fully rule out the possibility of inducing oppositional TG as a last resort measure. Checks and balances, both procedural and substantive, are then to become integral part of the unilateral and coercive inducement of oppositional TG. But the chances of impeccable lawfulness are quite low in light of the stringent procedures and conditions that apply, forming the basis for an obligation of strict moderation.