This chapter discusses the different categories of relations or connections that, in isolation or cumulatively, qualify as a means of control. This chapter adds a systematization of equity and nonequity modes of control to the existing corporate law literature. This ranges from traditional shareholding and share classes and contractual ties such as shareholder agreements and share lending contracts, to complex financial instruments, the significance of intermediated holdings, and to the role of participation on closed blockchain platforms and smart contracts governing the relationship between two or more companies. An important insight from the analysis described in this chapter is that a combined set of holdings can, due to its complex nature, lead to it running under the regulatory radar.

Alexander the Great's victories over Darius III and his satraps between 334 and 323 BCE have been for very long interpreted as the reliable testimony of the intrinsic feebleness and internal fragility of the Achaemenid empire, which expanded from Central Asia to Aswan and from the Indus to the Mediterranean Sea, and lasted for more than two centuries (c.550–330). And yet, notwithstanding the exceptional cultural and political diversity of the countries and peoples under the empire’s rule, the central authorities exercised a permanent control upon lands and seas. The best way for understanding the originality of such an ancient empire is to rule out the usual tricky alternative centralization versus independence/autonomy. Cultural diversity and imperial power are not mutually exclusive. The main feebleness of such a political construction was that, in front of a powerful (Macedonian) invasion, the central power could not count on any imperial ideology which would be shared by all the cultural components of the empire.