Interpreters have long recognized that there is a problem about determining what kind of activity Aristotle thinks happiness is. Some of his remarks appear to favor a single best kind of activity, intellectual contemplation. Other evidence suggests that it is an overarching activity that has various virtuous activities, ethical and intellectual, as parts. Interpreters typically view these as incompatible theses and try to show that one or the other apparent thesis is merely apparent. The problem of determining which of two incompatible theses Aristotle believes is the Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness. But the arguments that rival interpretations amass exert pressure to think that Aristotle really is committed to both of the allegedly incompatible claims. The problem of showing how he can coherently endorse both is the Conjunctive Problem of Happiness. Any dialectically satisfactory interpretation of Aristotles theory of happiness must solve it. None has done so. It cannot be solved while laboring under the weight of three common assumptions. Chapters 2–4 argue for the falsity of those assumptions and provide materials for constructing a solution to the Conjunctive Problem.

The essay seeks to identify in what way there is particularity to a Jewish theology of religions, as compared with the emergence of the field of theology of religions within a Christian context. Concern of Christian authors is with the problem of salvation and the common typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism reflects this concern. This typology does not translate well into a Jewish context and we must identify the concerns that lie at the heart of a Jewish theology of religions. The primary concern is that of the legitimacy of the other religion. The issue is negotiated first and foremost through the lens of idolatry (Avoda Zara) as well as through other lenses, such as the question of religious truth. The concerns of a Jewish theology of religions are illustrated through three case studies: Maimonides, R. Menachem Meiri and Rav Kook.