This chapter examines the contract for work and services which is governed by Articles 363–379 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. This chapter commences with the sources of this contract, its characteristic elements, its delimitations with other contracts as well as the diverse forms of this contract. This chapter then moves on to discuss the formation of the contract for work and services before discussing in detail the obligations of the contractor, namely the obligation to carry out and deliver the agreed work and the duty of diligent performance and other ancillary obligations, the contractor’s non-fulfilment of these obligations as well as the client’s obligation to pay the price. In this context, the contractor’s warranty of conformity is analysed in detail. Finally, this chapter explores the end of the contract for work and services either due to the client’s right to withdraw or subsequent impossibility.

In chapter 2 we discussed contract formation in general, whereas here we shall dive deeper into formality and delivery in particular. Before doing so, we need to lay the foundations by which to evaluate the legal impact of formality and delivery on civil and commercial contracts. It will be recalled that under the civil law tradition, contracts are predicated on three general pillars, namely: (i) consent, consisting of offer, acceptance and intention to be legally bound; (ii) subject-matter; and (iii) cause. In addition, there may, although not necessarily, exist two further requirements (special pillars), namely: (iv) formality; and (v) delivery

Contemporary thought on human rights is rooted in significant part in the soil of natural law theory. Some natural law theorists embrace the idea of enforceable rights to a range of desirable socioeconomic outcomes. But natural law theory is best understood as grounding rights that foster these outcomes indirectly. Such rights, as I envision them, qualify as socioeconomic rights because they directly concern the socioeconomic sphere and because they further those aspects of flourishing which alternative schemes of socioeconomic rights are often intended to protect. There is, I suggest, a plausible natural law case to be made for indirectly promoting these dimensions of well-being by enforcing legal rights to bodily integrity, property, and labor, and so accepting robust limits on the use of force. In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for an exploration of that case by elaborating the variety of natural law theory in which I seek to ground my understanding of socioeconomic rights. I go on to discuss norms germane to the institutional context of socioeconomic life and to propose a set of fundamental socioeconomic rights and briefly consider the significance of these rights.

Chapter 16 focuses on a comprehensive analysis of how the principal negotiators of the victorious powers sought to come to terms with the two most vital and indeed intricately interconnected questions of the entire peacemaking process: the challenge of establishing a new security architecture to stabilise the Atlantic world and make it “safe for democracy”; and the challenge of agreeing on the fundamental terms of the German settlement and how to deal with the pivotal problem of what shape and what status was to have in the postwar order. It reappraises how the protagonists came to forge a hybrid system of collective security that combined the novel guarantees of the League of Nations, temporary territorial guarantees, far-reaching disarmament of the defeated power and, crucially, specific security agreements under which Britain and the United States pledged to come to France’s aid in the case of unprovoked German aggression. And it offers a new interpretation both of the challenges of fortifying these elements into a new international concert system that could effectively secure the fledgling Atlantic peace and of the challenges of negotiating terms of a German settlement that could gain legitimacy not only among the victors but also on the part of the vanquished.

The book seeks to determine the manner in which the International Court of Justice interprets and applies the remedies generally accepted by the international community and codified by the International Law Commission in its Articles on State Responsibility. As such, it seeks to answer the following questions: i) Whether the International Court of Justice adopts a specific approach towards the remedies of international law? and ii) If yes, what are the justifications for this approach? The survey of theoretical perspectives, canvassing academic writings and subjective perspectives featured in the pleadings of the parties to the disputes, and the judgments of the Court, illustrates relevant results. The systematic analysis demonstrates that the Court has a distinct approach to the interpretation and application of remedies available in international law. While the Court is cautious in ordering precise actions from the parties, it appears to prioritise declarations regarding issues of legality.

Chapter 5 addresses the manner in which the International Court of Justice interprets and applies cessation and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition as remedies of international law. These remedies are treated in a single chapter because they are, to a certain degree, complementary. The definition and function of these remedies and their interaction with each other, and with other remedies of international law, such as specific performance or satisfaction, are issues that clarify their meaning. The manner in which cessation interacts with specific performance, and the relevance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, clarifies the manner in which this remedy is applied before the International Court of Justice. Further, the distinction between assurances and guarantees of non-repetition and their related formality, as provided by states through their pleadings before the Court and by the judicial body, through its judgments, contribute to the clarification of their substance.

Moreso writes about a theory of law related to legal positivism that has been highly influential in the Latin world, namely, Luigi Ferrajoli’s garantismo, or theory of constitutional guarantees or warrants. He explains that the word ‘garantismo’ suggests a conception of law as a system of constitutional guarantees of human rights, and distinguishes two main ideas in Ferrajoli’s account: the separation thesis and the distinction between valid law and law in force. For Ferrajoli, the very idea of constitutional rights gives rise to a distinction between validity and social efficacy, because even though the legislature might enact a statute that violates a constitutional right, the statute might become socially effective, and this means that there might be legally invalid norms that are nevertheless in force. Moreso also introduces Ferrajoli’s distinction between a constitutionalism of guarantees and a constitutionalism of rights, which he criticises, arguing, in particular, that accepting the rule/principles distinction does not have to lead to lack of legal certainty. Finally, he points out that Ferrajoli is an inclusive legal positivist.

The Westphalian Peace Treaty is widely regarded as the foundation of the modern international order (the so-called ‘Westphalian system’), characterised by the co-existence of sovereign states which do not acknowledge any superior power. But as recent research has shown this interpretation to be quite misleading, the aim of this chapter is to investigate how and when this perception emerged in the first place. Although the Westphalian Peace originated in a universal congress, that congress led to a particular Central European security order, rather than a universal peace treaty. It was, in fact, from the mid-18th century onwards that a new, ‘universal’ interpretation of the Westphalian Peace gained traction in intellectual debates and in treaty-making practice in Europe through repeated affirmation, eventually even between states that had not been party to the Peace itself; this led to its portrayal as the foundation of a universal state system and the droit de gens. In other words, the powerful notion of the ‘Westphalian system’ can be traced back not only to the late 1940s (as hitherto presumed), but to the ideas of 18th-century diplomats, politicians and intellectuals.

Financial sector developments pose the second important fiscal risk for the coming years and decades and this is the first of two chapters mapping and analysing such fiscal–financial risks. Rising financing costs affect debt service expenditure, especially for countries with high debt and short-term financing. Asset price movements can constitute further major fiscal risks in a downturn. Adverse financial sector developments and negative confidence effects also burden public expenditure and finances via the real economy, and guarantees that fall due in ‘bad’ times can exacerbate this effect. Debt has ratcheted up over consecutive economic and financial cycles over the past forty years, an effect particularly strong during the global financial crisis due to fiscal–financial linkages. Simulations show that the situation of several advanced countries is critical, given their lack of fiscal buffers for another crisis.

This chapter covered financial tools beyond conventional insurance, to cover self-insurance, risk-sharing agreements, forms of deposits, and various types of compensation funds. The common element is that the capital either remains solely with the actor or remains closer to the actor, so they are less costly on capital budgets. Self-insurance meant to book a financial reserve to cover certain future risks. In the late 1970s, the term began to include the concept of ‘captives,’ wherein a company owns its own insurance agency and write its own policies. Risk-sharing agreements are contractual agreements between similarly placed firms to agree to pay-up in capital, based on a pre-agreed ratio, to cover any of the co-parties’ capital needs to cover emergencies and damages. Various forms of deposits and guarantees involve a third party holding the capital of the risky first party until a certain event or time period has been successfully reached; however, this type of structure can create substantial moral hazards. Compensation funds can be created in two basic manners, the first is to have the actor pay while undertaking the risky activity in some form, while the second is to have public funds cover the cost of the funds.