Two decades into the ‘war on terror’, attention is rapidly shifting away from terrorism. Increasing geopolitical competition between the US and China and Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted talk about a watershed moment in global politics marked by a return of great power competition. To what extent has this paradigm shift – from terrorism to ‘traditional’ considerations of military security from external invasion – taken place in Southeast Asia? Building on securitisation theory, this article argues that the war on terror did not mark a universal historical-political period as it is often presented. In Southeast Asia, so-called non-traditional threats such as terrorism have concerned states since their independence. Therefore, Southeast Asia continued to prioritise ‘traditional’ security threats alongside ‘non-traditional’ ones in what is commonly described as its comprehensive approach to security. Consequently, when the ‘return to geopolitics’ began influencing military doctrine and preparation amongst NATO countries, a similar shift was absent in Southeast Asia. We argue that the region has seen varied emphases on non-traditional versus traditional security threats but did not experience the paradigm shift suggested by the US-dominated security narrative. Southeast Asia’s comprehensive security constellation underscores the need for a more pluralistic and eclectic approach to the study of international relations.

Despite the growing interest in secondary state efforts to avoid choosing sides in great power competition, International Relations scholars have paid scant attention to the question of how great powers respond to secondary state ‘hedging’. We offer a first approximation for this important question by focusing on ‘high-value’ hedgers, i.e. secondary states whose location or capabilities afford them the potential to tip the scales in a great power war. We posit that great powers are likely to accommodate high-value hedgers and refrain from trying to manipulate their alignment choice. This is because the likelihood and costs of losing a high-value hedger are such that competing great powers would rather be safe than sorry. Concretely, we expect established and rising great powers to (re)assure high-value hedgers: the former by demonstrating their commitment to a regional balance of power, and the latter by showing they harbour no ill intent towards the hedging secondary state. To probe our argument, we examine how Great Britain and Germany responded to Dutch hedging in the early 20th century, and how the United States and China are responding to Singapore’s hedging today.

This article develops a conceptual framework for explaining variation in the United States’ economic statecraft in the Cold War and the present day, focusing on how US officials perceived the type of geoeconomic capability that its rivals possessed and the type of national security challenge that they posed. This framework specifies four ideal-type strategies on the part of the United States: economic containment, national economic competition, technological containment, and national technological competition. Analyses of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, China, and Japan support the theory. These ideal types explain why, in the rivalry with Japan in the 1980s, the United States openly engaged in competition but did not adopt containment, relying on Voluntary Export Restraints, currency devaluation agreements, and bilateral semiconductor agreements rather than placing Japan on something historically analogous to the Commerce Department's contemporary Entity List or targeting Japan with comprehensive export controls through an institution like CoCom. These ideal types (and the theory behind them) also explain why the United States has implemented containment measures against specific Chinese companies but has not pursued a systematic “decoupling” of the US and Chinese economies.

In the contemporary world order, one of the most attention-getting issues is the recent consolidation of defense and strategic engagement between China and Russia, specifically since the early 2010s. Throughout a critical juncture angle, this study attempts to explain what led to the reinforcement of these China–Russia relations, and how their strategic ties have evolved. This study argues that the three critical junctures driven by the USA – the US Pivot to Asia, the Ukraine Crisis and the US-led sanctions against Russia, and the US THAAD deployment to Korea – aggravated China and Russia's perception of threat from the USA, which contributed to the incremental China–Russia strategic and defense ties.

Is foreign aid an effective instrument of soft power? Does it generate affinity for donor countries and the values they espouse? This article answers these questions in the context of Chinese aid to Africa and the competing aid regime of the United States. The study combines data on thirty-eight African countries from Afrobarometer, AidData, and the Aid Information Management Systems of African finance and planning ministries. The authors use spatial difference-in-differences to isolate the causal effects of Chinese and US aid. The study finds that Chinese aid to Africa does not increase (and may in fact reduce) beneficiaries’ support for China. By contrast, US aid appears to increase support for the United States and to strengthen recipients’ commitment to liberal democratic values, such as the belief in the importance of elections. Chinese aid does not appear to weaken this commitment, and may strengthen it. The study also finds that Chinese aid increases support for the UK, France and other former colonial powers. These findings advance our understanding of the conditions under which competing aid regimes generate soft power and facilitate the transmission of political principles and ideals.

This article asks how costly targeted trade sanctions imposed by the US government are for domestic firms. I argue that, as a result of sanctions, the firm value of US companies that have supply relationships with sanctioned entities is likely to suffer from lost revenue, reputational damage, and business model uncertainty. I test this expectation by applying an event study to the important case of targeted trade sanctions against Chinese technology companies. I find that sanctions against these companies reduced their US suppliers’ risk-adjusted stock returns by 220 basis points. Firm-level cross-sectional analysis shows that businesses with stronger ties to the sanctioned entities are more negatively affected, which supports the direct connection between sanctions and relevant suppliers. Measuring the domestic economic ramifications of sanctions for the sender country has been elusive. These findings, which are statistically and economically significant, indicate that US companies face notable costs from sanctions against internationally active firms.