In Chapter 4, I take up two problems. The first problem focuses on “noninstitutional” violations of people’s rights. The second problem focuses on affluent people’s positive obligations in the face of slow-moving institutional change. In response, I develop an account of negative and positive interpersonal obligations. I first argue that while we have a primary obligation to advance institutional justice, we also have interpersonal obligations that constrain our interpersonal behavior. If human rights norms don’t apply to interpersonal interactions, then a human rights theory won’t be able to account for noninstitutional violations. In response to the second problem, I draw from Peter Singer’s shallow pond example and the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37). Building on these examples, I argue that affluent people have greater obligations to severely poor people than commonsense judgments suggest.

Harm reduction refers to a set of strategies aimed to limit the negative consequences associated with drug use, but without requiring complete abstinence. Some harm-reduction strategies aim to reduce the risk of overdose, such as the use of naloxone rescue kits, fentanyl testing strips, and implementation of Good Samaritan laws. Other strategies lower the risk of overdose but also the likelihood of contracting infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis. Syringe services programs, also referred to as needle exchange programs, and supervised consumption facilities all fall under this category. Medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD), which include methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone, have been proven to lower the risk of overdose, improve the likelihood of maintaining sobriety, and therefore lower rates of disease transmission. Finally, harm reduction is utilized in criminal justice system through the use of drug decriminalization, police diversion programs, and drug treatment courts.

Theorizes three facets of global justice that were introduced in the preceding chapter. Each is addressed in different aspects of human rights practice, and each has its own repertoire, or set of tools, for justice seeking. Although they overlap, they are also time-ordered and somewhat cumulative. The first aspect of justice is the development of Samaritan-like care and concern for the conditions that prevent people from living free and full lives. Human rights actors linked human rights action to a notion of care that broadens the appropriate subject of care to a global neighborhood. The second aspect pertains to an institutional structure in which legal norms offer independent standards of justice. Human rights actors generated arguments based on law and concern that transformed rights into a language of legal justice and accountability that can be employed in appeals to power holders. The third aspect calls for the integration of social justice into politics as human rights standards upholding economic, social, and cultural equity, including gender and racial inclusion.

Thou shall not return a refugee to persecution. Nation-states declared they had learned that critical lesson from the tragedy of the Holocaust by enacting international refugee conventions and protocols. Today, as refugees seek safety, they find fortress-like liberal democracies building walls of steel interlaced with legal strategies that undermine the international protections forged from the fires of the Holocaust. Consequently, refugees drown in the Mediterranean, die in the Mexico-United States desert, become detained in overcrowded refugee camps and unofficial street shelters, or become victims of criminal gangs. Nation-states have all too often abdicated their responsibility to refugees. This chapter explores this interlocking struggle between Christian hospitality toward the outsider and Christian refusal to offer that hospitality in support of national security. Christian beliefs that encourage submission to governing authorities and prioritize the nation undermine international law to the detriment of not just refugees but also citizens and the world community.

Farwell v. Keaton is the classic torts case that has introduced generations of law students to the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule which allows individuals to refrain from aiding persons in peril. The case is an exception, imposing a duty on a teenage boy who failed to come to the aid of his companion who died after being beaten by a group of boys. The court emphasized the relationship between the parties and the fact that the defendant had rendered some initial aid to his friend. The rewritten feminist opinion also imposes a duty but replaces the myriad common-law exceptions to the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule. Embracing a humanitarian approach based on the circumstantial connection between the parties in the case, the feminist judgment imposes liability whenever failure to do so would “shock the conscience,” placing US tort law on par with the law in many European nations. The accompanying commentary recharacterizes the case as one involving sexual harassment and stalking, focusing on the behavior of the defendant and his companion who set the chain of events in motion when they followed two teenaged girls who later complained to the assailants.