Chapter 3 presents models in which artificial agents interact through games. It first introduces a typical mainstream economics model known as the prisoner’s dilemma, in which agents interact through a classic game theory game, and then contrast it with an artificial evolutionary game based on the same dilemma. In this evolutionary game, the dynamic evolution of a population of boundedly rational agents is represented and simulated using a genetic algorithm. It finally contrasts the assumptions of artificial economics against those of mainstream economics when modeling games.

Chapter 2 focuses on market interactions between artificial agents. First, it introduces two versions of the famous Sugarscape model, which is an excellent model for getting into artificial economics. In the first version, artificial agents are very simple and dedicated, in an environment in which there is only one resource called sugar, to collect and consume that resource to meet their metabolic needs. In the second version, the environment provides two resources, sugar and spice. And the artificial agents are more sophisticated, as they are not only dedicated to collecting and consuming such resources but also engage in market exchanges of them. Finally, it presents a static and a dynamic general equilibrium model of market economies, typical of mainstream economics, in a way that illustrates by contrast the assumptions of artificial economics versus the ones of mainstream economics when modeling markets.