The CIF NOLA “river market” represents an important but opaque forward market that serves Gulf exporters and elevators. CIF NOLA bids function similarly to traditional forward contracts; however, like a futures market, firms can offset their forward contractual obligations by offsetting positions in a liquid off-exchange paper market. Analysis shows grain sellers pay a risk premium for fall harvest delivery contracts. However, outside of fall harvest, contract liquidity, coupled with a good institutional balance of long and short market participants, mostly removes the pricing bias commonly found in farmer forward contracting in corn and soybeans.

Although apparently preferred by farmers to direct hedging as a forward pricing mechanism, forward contracting has received little attention in the literature dealing with optimal forward pricing levels. An often-cited reason for producer preference for forward contracting is the absence of basis risks under that forward pricing alternative. This paper presents models of optimal forward contracting and hedging under price and yield uncertainty within a mean-variance framework. The results indicate that basis certainty does not explain preferences for forward contracting.

Agricultural lenders have a stake in and are in a position to influence their borrowers' management decisions. Risk management practice adoption is an area in which lenders might want to exercise this influence. This study employs logistic statistical models to estimate lenders' influence on crop producers' decisions regarding use of three alternative risk management practices: federal multiple-peril crop insurance, crop hail and fire insurance, and forward contracting. Results suggest lenders can exert significant influence on these decisions but that poor communication between lenders and borrowers likely reduces this influence.

Risk management education has been a focus of U.S. farm policy since 1996. In support of significant ongoing United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) educational efforts, this study examines agricultural producers' educational needs and interests. Data obtained through a survey of crop producers are used in probit models examining interest in additional training in five areas including forward contracting, futures and options, crop yield insurance, crop revenue insurance, and financial management. The study results should be useful in determining appropriate risk management education program content and in identifying and tailoring to specific target audiences.

Two methods were used to estimate the cost of forward contracting hard red winter wheat. One hundred days before delivery, the estimated cost of forward contracting ranged from six cents/bu. to eight cents/bu. Thus, further evidence is provided that the cost of forward contracting grain is not zero.

Factors affecting the adoption of crop insurance, forward contracting, and spreading sales are analyzed using multivariate and multinomial probit approaches that account for simultaneous adoption and/or correlation among the three risk management adoption decisions. Our empirical results suggest that the decision to adopt crop insurance, forward contracting, and/or spreading sales are correlated. Richer insights can be drawn from our multivariate and multinomial probit analysis than from separate, single-equation probit estimation that assumes independence of adoption decisions. Some factors significantly affecting the adoption of the risk management tools analyzed are proportion of owned acres, off-farm income, education, age, and level of business risks.