From 2016 to 2020 Australia put in place new legislation to counter perceived threats to Australia’s security, including the National Security (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Cth) (‘Foreign Interference Act’), Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth) (‘FITS’) and Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (Cth) (‘Foreign Relations Act’). These domestic laws, which are enforced by the police and other security agencies, were presented as a response to foreign interference in Australian politics and democracy, especially by the People’s Republic of China. During the same period, Australia’s relationship with China deteriorated markedly, including a freeze on high-level contacts and trade retaliation. This chapter focuses on the impact of these new domestic laws on Australia’s international relations and assesses whether they were a significant factor in the worsening of Australia–China relations during this period.

Chapter 4 looks at the restitution of liberalism as a potential model for political change during the Arab Spring and then its inability to shape outcomes in Egypt and Syria due to structural, organizational, and international reasons. The chapter refutes the narrative that the Arab Spring was the result of a leaderless movement of an alienated youth and loose associations of activists. It asserts that this overall analysis ignores the years of liberal activism against the extant patterns of domination and authority in the region, and the fact that protestors rallied behind a set of ideas that were consistently different from the ones rallied behind in the 1950s–1960s.What is missed in most studies is the deep and consistent transformation and reformulation of the object of discontent. Millions confronted their States despite the threat of violence, and in so doing they showed that liberal notions were vibrantly hiding in plain sight.

How do citizens respond to information on electoral interference in their country? Chapter 6 presents the second vignette survey experiment, and we again see individuals taking distinct positions on citizenship norms that correspond to partisanship. Like in polarization, we see status quo challengers respond to threat. Unlike polarization, they respond not with norms of liberal democratic beliefs but with behavior – that is, expectations of a more active, engaged citizenry. Moreover, we also observe a strong status quo bias, in which winners of the election in question generally do nothing. Where norms are affected for citizens supporting incumbent power holders, we observe impatience (US) and demobilization (UK). Meanwhile, the partisan left – as governing outsiders and losers of the elections in question – are more likely to value vigilance – watching the government (US, UK) and understanding how politics and the government work (UK, Germany), alongside other active, engaged citizenship attributes. Evidence of interference in majoritarian systems, compared to Germany’s consensus political system, produces stronger partisan differences.