In the context of a technology-driven algorithmic
approach to criminal justice, this paper responds to
the following three questions: (1) what reasons are
there for treating liberal values and human rights
as guiding for punitive justice; (2) is preventive
justice comparable to punitive justice (such that
the guiding values of the latter should be applied
to the former); and (3) what should we make of
preventive measures that rely not so much on rules
and orders, but on ‘technological management’ (where
the preventive strategy is focused on eliminating
practical options)? Responding to the first
question, a Gewirthian-inspired theory of punishment
is sketched – a theory that is, broadly speaking,
supportive of liberal values and respect for human
rights. What makes this theory apodictic for any
human agent is that it demands respect for the very
conditions on which any articulation of agency is
predicated. With regard to the second question, we
indicate how a Gewirthian view of the relationship
between punitive and preventive justice supports the
logic of referring to the principles that guide the
former as a benchmark for the latter; and we suggest
some particular principles of preventive justice
where the restrictions are targeted at individual
agents (whether in their own right or as members of
classes). Finally, we suggest that, although
technological management of crime changes the
complexion of the regulatory environment in ways
that might be a challenge to a Gewirthian moral
community, it should not be categorically rejected.
Crucially, technological management, like other
preventive strategies, needs to be integrated into
the community's moral narrative and authorised only
to the extent that it is compatible with the
governing moral principles.