Agricultural sales cooperative unions (ASCUs) in Turkey are heavily influenced by both domestic and international government policies. Both export taxes and import tariffs are used as policy tools to regulate cotton markets. Domestic price support programs, water subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, and credit subsidies have also been used as domestic policy tools. These types of subsidies are not uncommon among developing countries. This paper provides empirical estimates of the degree of economic inefficiency associated with government intervention in Turkish cotton markets. A two-region partial equilibrium model of cotton exports and imports is developed under the “small country assumption” to obtain empirical estimates of the deadweight welfare loss associated with these government subsidies. Although government intervention results in significant income distribution among the various cotton sectors within Turkey, the overall economic inefficiency of the redistribution is very low.

The impacts of using export taxes as a price control in a multi-market framework are explored using the cotton and yarn sectors in Pakistan as examples. Results show that the export tax on cotton increased domestic consumption and decreased exports of cotton in Pakistan, transferring income from cotton producers to yarn spinners and the government. There was a social loss to Pakistan in the cotton sector. The export tax on cotton increased domestic yarn production, consumption, exports, and incomes of yarn spinners, but resulted in a large transfer (social loss) out of the yarn sector.