Multiple states have enacted statutes to govern procedures when a state seeks to execute a person who may be incompetent to understand why s/he is being so punished, an area of the law that has always been riddled with confusion. The Supreme Court, in Panetti v. Quarterman, sought to clarify matters, ruling that a mentally ill defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness “obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.”

However, the first empirical studies of how Panetti has been interpreted in federal courts painted a dismal picture. Only a handful of defendants have ever been successful in federal courts in seeking to enforce the Panetti ruling, and the authors of this abstract have characterized the relief ostensibly offered by that case as nothing more than an “illusion” or a “mirage” in a federal context. The issues of believability of experts, allegations of malingering, and “synthetic competency” dominate these decisions.

In this paper, we seek to expand this inquiry to determine (1) how defendants in state courts seeking to assert Panetti claims have fared, and (2) the extent to which state statutes have made any meaningful difference in the way such cases have been decided. We also investigate the significance of the fact that the caselaw in this area has totally ignored the teachings of the school of legal thought known as therapeutic jurisprudence and offer some conclusions and recommendations (based on therapeutic jurisprudence principles) that, if implemented, can (at least partially) ameliorate this situation.

This paper explores the thorny mingling of law with qualitative social science methodologies through the lens of the 2010–11 Supreme Court of British Columbia Charter Reference on polygamy, which was conducted to determine whether the criminalization of polygamy was consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Reference reveals how the marginalization of qualitative research(ers) effectively controlled whose voices were to be heard and whose were to be silenced in the broader project of sovereign intervention into family formation. With specific focus on Professor Angela Campbell, who provided expert opinion testimony in the Reference, this paper reflects on two important questions: when social science is invoked in legal settings, whose knowledge is legitimized, and who benefits from this legitimization? Drawing upon the longstanding feminist project of deconstructing assumptions of value-neutrality in all science, this paper considers how qualitative, feminist research(ers) may be inherently at odds with law’s quest for (rational) “truth.”

Objectives: The aim of this study was to determine the aspects of expert advice that decision makers find most useful in the development of evidence-based guidance and to identify the characteristics of experts providing the most useful advice.

Methods: First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with seventeen members of the Interventional Procedures Advisory Committee of the UK's National Institute of Health and Care Excellence. Interviews examined the usefulness of expert advice during guidance development. Transcripts were analyzed inductively to identify themes. Second, data were extracted from 211 experts’ questionnaires for forty-one consecutive procedures. Usefulness of advice was scored using an index developed through the qualitative work. Associations between usefulness score and characteristics of the expert advisor were investigated using univariate and multivariate analyses.

Results: Expert opinion was seen as a valued complement to empirical evidence, providing context and tacit knowledge unavailable in published literature, but helpful for interpreting it. Interviewees also valued advice on the training and experience required to perform a procedure, on patient selection criteria and the place of a procedure within a clinical management pathway. Limitations of bias in expert opinion were widely acknowledged and skepticism expressed regarding the anecdotal nature of advice on safety or efficacy outcomes. Quantitative analysis demonstrated that the most useful advice was given by clinical experts with direct personal experience of the procedure, particularly research experience.

Conclusions: Evidence-based guidance production is often characterized as a rational, pipeline process. This ignores the valuable role that expert opinion plays in guidance development, complementing and supporting the interpretation of empirical data.

Using court records involving the expert testimony of the Berlin sexologist Albert Moll, my article demonstrates that during the early 1920s a shift in the ‘epistemologies of justice’ concerning the adjudication of sex crimes took place within German courtrooms. Namely, presiding judges considered a greater number of sexual acts as punishable, despite no change in the laws themselves. Central to my argument is the role of expert testimony in practice and its critical reception. By focusing upon the rhetorical strategies presented by attorneys, judges and expert witnesses (as well as defendants themselves and their relatives), it illustrates the functions of expert and tacit knowledge in court, which were often not mutually exclusive. Moll’s stature also enabled him to translate his scientific–medical expertise into state support for his testimonies, as well as the rebuilding of an international community of sexological authorities. It was only under Moll’s leadership that the First International Sexology Congress could take place in 1926, an event that marked the apex of his prestige.

This article explores the status, apparatus and character of forensic pathology in the inter-war period, with a special emphasis on the ‘people’s pathologist’, Bernard Spilsbury. The broad expert and public profile of forensic pathology, of which Spilsbury was the most prominent contemporary representative, will be outlined and discussed. In so doing, close attention will be paid to the courtroom strategies by which he and other experts translated their isolated post-mortem encounters with the dead body into effective testimony.

Pathologists built a high-profile practice that transfixed the popular, legal and scientific imagination, and this article also explores, through the celebrated 1925 murder trial of Norman Thorne, how Spilsbury’s courtroom performance focused critical attention on the practices of pathology itself, which threatened to destabilise the status of forensic pathology. In particular, the Thorne case raised questions about the interrelation between bruising and putrefaction as sources of interpretative anxiety. Here, the question of practice is vital, especially in understanding how Spilsbury’s findings clashed with those of rival pathologists whose autopsies centred on a corpse that had undergone further putrefactive changes and that had thereby mutated as an evidentiary object. Examining how pathologists dealt with interpretative problems raised by the instability of their core investigative object enables an analysis of the ways in which pathological investigation of homicide was inflected with a series of conceptual, professional and cultural difficulties stemming in significant ways from the materiality of the corpse itself.

This article presents early findings of a larger study of twentieth-century English homicide investigation which focuses on the interaction between two dominant forensic regimes: the first, outlined in part here, is a body-centred forensics, associated with the lone, ‘celebrity’ pathologist, his scalpel and the mortuary slab; the second is a ‘forensics of things’ centred on the laboratory and its associated technologies of trace analysis (hair, blood, fibres), deployed in closed technician-dominated spaces and in the regimentally managed crime scene. Future work will seek to illuminate the shifting landscape of English forensics by following the historical interplay between these two powerful investigative models.

This paper analyses the driving forces behind the willingness of South African courts to hear actuarial expert testimony in even the most simple of cases, in contrast to the more circumspect approach of the English courts, when assessing the damages arising out of future loss of earnings following a damage-causing incident. The analysis may well add insight to members of other professions and scientific communities that provide expert testimony to the courts. It is argued that English substantive law of damages and those influenced by its application have something to gain from a consideration of the approach in South Africa.