Chapter 3 presents models in which artificial agents interact through games. It first introduces a typical mainstream economics model known as the prisoner’s dilemma, in which agents interact through a classic game theory game, and then contrast it with an artificial evolutionary game based on the same dilemma. In this evolutionary game, the dynamic evolution of a population of boundedly rational agents is represented and simulated using a genetic algorithm. It finally contrasts the assumptions of artificial economics against those of mainstream economics when modeling games.

Chapter 7 introduces the subject matter of artificial complexity. First, it presents examples of artificial complexity by means of cellular automata. It presents one-dimensional cellular automata following Wolfram’s rules, and a two-dimensional cellular automaton in the form of a spatial evolutionary game.Then it introduces the concepts of complexity and emergence, as used in the science of complexity, and discusses some issues related to their definition and measurement. Finally, it discusses the scope and controversies around the application of the concepts and models of the science of complexity in economics.