IR proceeds on a Eurocentric ontological assumption that sovereignty has universal validity today. How can IR be decolonised, when in spite of countless examples of the enactment of ‘sovereignty otherwise’, the discipline remains unconcerned with the fact that the logic of sovereignty remains uni-versal. The question is as much political as it is intellectual, because as a discipline, we have allowed the inertia of our professional rhythms to marginalise pluri-versal sovereignty, or the organisation of sovereignty along different ontological starting points. I argue IR must abandon its disciplinary love affair with uni-versal sovereignty. The tendency to ‘bring in’ new perspectives by inserting them into an already ontologically constituted set of assumptions works to protect IR’s Eurocentricity, which makes disciplinary decolonisation untenable. I propose that as a starting point, IR needs to be more mature about recognising the decolonisations that are happening under our very feet if we are to stand a chance at disciplinary level decolonisation. As an illustrative example, I explore an ongoing collision of settler-colonial and Mi’kmaw sovereignty through the issue of lobster fisheries in Mi’kma’ki, or Nova Scotia as the territory is known to Canadians.

This article explores the importance of anti-racism in a higher Education context. With reference to the recent discussions on de-colonising the curriculum, I reflect on the importance of the Black Lives Matter movement. I argue more vehemently than ever before – enough is enough – we have no choice but to teach against racism. This article discusses the importance of de-colonising the curriculum and Higher Education and creating learning environments that open out discussions about everyday racism. This, I argue, is core to our anti-racist practise if we intend to build a fairer and a more anti-racist world.

This essay critically examines T. O. Elias's international legal scholarship, especially in so far as he sought to reclaim, or claim, a place in international legal history for Africa. Having found that Africa contributed to the formation of international law, Elias argued in favour of reforming its rules so that they could serve the interests of the newly independent African states. In this respect he influenced many contemporary international lawyers in Africa and elsewhere. In particular, his singling out of sovereignty as a barrier to reforming international law is shared by generations of international legal scholars who have criticized states for placing too high a premium on their sovereignty, thereby placing insuperable barriers to their acceptance of egalitarian goals, expressed by, for example, the international bill of human rights. The essay also contrasts Elias to scholars of international law who took the colonial legacy of international law as a barrier to reforming it so that it was consistent with the interests of so-called post-colonial African states.

This article reviews the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island with reference to acquisition of title to territory under international law. It traces the ICJ's use of evidence of African use and occupation to establish territorial sovereignty in a European state. The tests adopted by the Court are based on Eurocentric assumptions that only the consent of European states is necessary to adjudicate nineteenth century claims of title to territory. International law still carries forward within it the colonial notion that treaties between colonial powers in the nineteenth century extinguished pre-existing title to territory based on African use and occupation. The decision gives probative value to economic intentions of colonizing powers and geographical and scientific evidence in determining title to the disputed island while Africa use and occupation of territory is sidelined. Africa is treated as an unconscious geographical entity – a feature referred to as geographical Hegelianism in this article.