This chapter provides an introduction to the book. A focus on the social construction of corruption leads to the two main conclusions. First, corruption is a tool of government, because it offers reasons for elites to remain cohesive. These incentives may be in the form of both benefits and punishments. To the first type belong the enticements of corruption, and they are reinforced whenever the ruler has the possibility to assign at will the label “corrupt” and the ensuing punishments. This helps rulers solve a problem of control, which is a prerequisite for political order and a vital necessity of any political system. However, corruption as a tool of government has fundamental flaws. The second broad conclusion is that anti-corruption is a tool of politics, because it can be used to pursue a political agenda. Additionally, corruption is a tool of politics which is available more widely, because it is a powerful “valence issue,” that is, one of those issues on which most people agree, either negatively (as for corruption) or positively (as it would be, e.g., for “competence”). However, as a tool of politics anti-corruption has many shortcomings.

The tension between democratic autonomy and judicial authority over democratic process cannot be wholly resolved. The best way to balance this dilemma incorporates an unsettling reality about the freedom that vindicates democratic self-rule: the values and realization of freedom are necessarily the subjects of ongoing intractable struggle over its moral meaning. This perpetual contestability also offers the possibility of reimagining judicial review. This chapter exploits the election law doctrine’s fiercely unsettled case law to suggest that continual judicial debate about the appropriate terms of democratic freedom is the best way to reconcile judicial review with constituent self-determination. Conceiving of judicial review of election law as a dispute over self-rule answers the challenge at three levels: it (1) explains how nonaccountable courts can play a legitimate institutional role in democratic self-determination; (2) allows courts to opine on self-rule without overdetermining the meaning of freedom, and thus undermining its moral value; and (3) offers the best account of the doctrine as a battle over the meaning of liberalism.