This chapter concludes by answering the three research questions examined in this study: How have the rationale, method, and limits for the balancing of competition and non-competition interests in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU evolved in the first sixty years of its existence? How has this process of evolution affected the attainment of the objectives of Regulation 1/2003, namely effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty? And what role should non-competition interests play in order to conform to such objectives? It presents the three transitions in balancing that emerge through modernisation and discusses their impact on the effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty of the enforcement. In addition, it offers policy recommendations on how non-competition interests should be taken into account in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.

This chapter examines the implicit-procedural balancing tools, embedded in the exercise of the competition enforcers’ discretion and priority setting powers. Modernisation has entrusted the Commission and NCAs with a new balancing tool in the form of their discretional enforcement powers. Moreover, it has incentivised the Commission and NCAs to direct their enforcement efforts towards clear-cut infringements of Article 101 TFEU, which are unlikely to be justified by overriding non-competition interests. The competition enforcers have used their detection, target, instrument, and outcome discretion to decide not to enforce Article 101 TFEU against other types of agreements even when they do not meet the conditions for an exception under Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. As a result, investigations into agreements that raised balancing questions were often settled with negotiated remedies or terminated by closing the probe into the case altogether. The chapter investigated various aspects of priority setting, including the selection of a strategy for identifying anti-competitive behaviour; the choice of whether to open an investigation and pursue a case; choice of enforcement instrument (sector regulation, markets-work, informal opinions, and the effect on trade test); and selection of remedies (fines, commitments, and findings of inapplicability).

This chapter concludes by answering the three research questions examined in this study: How have the rationale, method, and limits for the balancing of competition and non-competition interests in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU evolved in the first sixty years of its existence? How has this process of evolution affected the attainment of the objectives of Regulation 1/2003, namely effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty? And what role should non-competition interests play in order to conform to such objectives? It presents the three transitions in balancing that emerge through modernisation and discusses their impact on the effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty of the enforcement. In addition, it offers policy recommendations on how non-competition interests should be taken into account in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.

This chapter examines the implicit-procedural balancing tools, embedded in the exercise of the competition enforcers’ discretion and priority setting powers. Modernisation has entrusted the Commission and NCAs with a new balancing tool in the form of their discretional enforcement powers. Moreover, it has incentivised the Commission and NCAs to direct their enforcement efforts towards clear-cut infringements of Article 101 TFEU, which are unlikely to be justified by overriding non-competition interests. The competition enforcers have used their detection, target, instrument, and outcome discretion to decide not to enforce Article 101 TFEU against other types of agreements even when they do not meet the conditions for an exception under Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. As a result, investigations into agreements that raised balancing questions were often settled with negotiated remedies or terminated by closing the probe into the case altogether. The chapter investigated various aspects of priority setting, including the selection of a strategy for identifying anti-competitive behaviour; the choice of whether to open an investigation and pursue a case; choice of enforcement instrument (sector regulation, markets-work, informal opinions, and the effect on trade test); and selection of remedies (fines, commitments, and findings of inapplicability).