The chapter describes first the importance of Jacobsohn’s work to constitutional theory in general as it relies on the ideas of dynamism, fluidity, disharmony and imperfection to describe a constitution’s functioning. It then focuses on the German constitutional conflict on binding electoral gender quotas in order to illustrate the pertinence of his theory that describes so aptly the functioning of a constitution. It concludes with the finding that, in terms of constitutional theory, Jacobsohn has indeed cracked the genetic code of a constitution.

Can enforcement of India’s gender equal property inheritance reform advance equality by bringing about meaningful reorganization of familial responsibilities? Quotas increasing women’s political representation strengthen enforcement of gender-equalizing land inheritance reform (as Chapter 5 shows). Such enforcement may increase conflict within the family. This chapter finds families are more likely to block equal distribution of inheritance to daughters, conditional on the anticipated cost of losing ancestral property rights. This “cost” can be transformed into a benefit for the entire family when female gatekeepers spur integrative bargaining solutions, striking agreements about the distribution of rights and responsibilities across multiple domains simultaneously. This chapter identifies the causal effect on behavior of as-if randomly applied reservations for female elected heads of local government on the willingness of children to support aging parents. It finds that when daughters leverage female gatekeepers to exercise symbolic land rights, conflict is unlikely, and women are more able to care for aging parents, choosing closer marriages and planning to financially support parents. However, when a daughter gains gender-equal property inheritance after exiting marriage negotiations, all children revoke support for parents.

When do quotas for women’s political representation promote economic gender equality? Legislative reforms equalizing economic rights are common globally, with mixed results. I consider the impact of quotas on women’s rights in a crucial domain: property. I first explain my research method, utilizing more than two years of qualitative research and quantitative data. I leverage exogenously set electoral quotas—reservations—for women as heads of local government in India. Reservations enable clean identification of the impact of representation on enforcing gender-equalizing land inheritance reforms. I find that political representation enables women to secure property rights and ensure that they are upheld. However, backlash occurs when reservations guaranteeing female representation make enforcement of reform credible. Women can reduce this backlash by utilizing female representation to trade traditional monetary dowry for property inheritance and familial responsibilities. This, in turn, reduces the “cost” of reform to men. These findings confirm the power of political representation. However, quotas for female representation will be successful at incentivizing economic gender equality only to the extent they also provide women with resources to pursue enforcement of rights in ways that provide opportunities for integrative bargaining solutions.