The chapter considers the process of nomination and election of judges, as well as their qualifications and the outcomes of the election process. It then examines the way in which the Court engages as a judicial body with the parties, with specific reference to the Court’s exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. Finally, it discusses the process of decision making, before drawing conclusions on the outcomes of that process, i.e. the judgments and opinions of the Court.

This Chapter will show that this structured model of proportionality does not exist in the Indonesian constitutional realm, even though the term proportionality has been formally used by the Constitutional Court since 2010.While there is a textual basis under the Indonesian Constitution for constitutional rights to be balanced with other important interests – Article 28J (2) of the 1945 Constitution – the Indonesian Constitutional Court has used Article 28J (2) instead as an interpretative tool to limit or ignore the bill of rights. The Court’s jurisprudence to date suggests that the Court considers Article 28J (2) as a “trump card” to override constitutional rights. This Chapter further argues that the principle of proportionality has never flourished in Indonesian soil because of the lack of intellectual leadership in the Constitutional Court. The majority of the Constitutional Court Justices are not well versed with the notion of proportionality, and the Indonesian legal academia has also failed to generate a robust discussion on the principle of proportionality.