Human rights due diligence (HRDD) is a buzzword in business and human rights (BHR) activities. However, multinational corporations (MNCs) often conduct it as a tick-box exercise without transparency. Using a relational contract theory, this article argues that when MNCs contract with local communities through community development agreements (CDAs) to perform HRDD, such contracts are internationalized relational contracts that attract a level of good faith. An established principle in international economic law, good faith serves as a standard for assessing conduct designed to discharge obligations in international contracts between states and MNCs (investor-state contracts). Similar to how investor-state arbitration tribunals use good faith jurisprudence in regulating the relationship between states and MNCs, this article proposes a BHR good faith jurisprudence to prescribe how HRDD obligations should be discharged. The article concludes that a good faith interpretational exercise in BHR would (1) reduce MNCs’ cosmetic compliance with HRDD principles; (2) increase transparency in the HRDD exercise; and (3) become a source of rights for local communities to enforce corporate accountability.

At issue in the SNC-Lavalin scandal was a new tool of corporate criminal law: remediation agreements. Introduced in 2018, remediation agreements allow corporate diversion and create an alternative to the prosecution of corporations suspected of criminal wrongdoing. This article examines why the federal government adopted and chose this particular new tool. Drawing on a wide-ranging documentary record, I argue that this reform was the product of transnational lawmaking and the ongoing influence of Canada's international commitments to prohibit and punish foreign bribery. The article shows how international criticism of Canada's lacklustre anti–foreign bribery enforcement record catalyzed cross-national policy diffusion and learning from other states. This led Canada to adopt corporate diversion, which promised greater enforcement, and also led Canada to adopt a form of the practice with legislative and judicial limits that narrowed the chances of any company—including SNC-Lavalin—of obtaining a remediation agreement.

Comparison is a very common tool for international lawyers. In fact, international law is built around, and draws upon, constructions necessitating an exercise of comparison. In recent years, however, calls have been made to turn the familiar tool of comparison into a central way to engage with international law. This is the idea of those spearheading the rise of a new field called comparative international law. This article critically examines the promotion of comparison as a central mode of engagement with international law and scrutinizes some of the main features of the comparativist project. It particularly shows that the comparativist project, far from laying bare the plurality of international legal thought and practice, enables a thought-colonizing enterprise. The article ends with some reflective observations on the possibility of limiting colonizing thinking in international legal studies. In doing so, it argues that it must remain possible for international lawyers to engage with alterity in a way that does not unilaterally manufacture the “other,” silence it, and speak on its behalf. This approach is called counter-comparability.

The Nuremberg Trials provide the foundation for contemporary international criminal law. Yet these trials are rarely explored in their broader ideational and social context. This article examines the context and role of the concept of “civilization” as used in U.S. v Altstoetter, the 1947 trial of Nazi judges and judicial administrators at Nuremberg. I place the reference to civilization in Altstoetter within a tradition of international law that understood law and civilization as co-constitutive. The Altstoetter Court conceptualized Germany as an essentially civilized country that lapsed into barbaric and therefore lawless violence. This account helped the Court to establish the blameworthiness of the defendants' conduct, blame the Nazi violence on lawlessness, and establish its own authority.

In a context where cultural difference is for many a source of apprehension, often leading to discrimination against minority groups, culture and cultural rights are particularly important for Indigenous peoples. However, compared with the promotion and protection of other human rights, the marginalization of cultural rights is readily apparent. This article explores one of the sources of this marginalization by asking the following question: to what extent does the concept of culture within the field of international law influence the promotion and protection of cultural rights of minority groups? The author claims that ambiguity around the notion of culture and the absence of a binding definition in the international human rights field yield a reductionist conception of culture. By failing to do justice to minority cultural rights, this conception impacts the realization of those rights and exacerbates certain exclusions. A re-conceptualization of the notion of culture, one that accounts for anthropological ideas and concepts, is therefore needed.