Cognitive deficits in depressed adults may reflect impaired decision-making. To investigate this possibility, we analyzed data from unmedicated adults with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and healthy controls as they performed a probabilistic reward task. The Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM) was used to quantify decision-making mechanisms recruited by the task, to determine if any such mechanism was disrupted by depression.

Data came from two samples (Study 1: 258 MDD, 36 controls; Study 2: 23 MDD, 25 controls). On each trial, participants indicated which of two similar stimuli was presented; correct identifications were rewarded. Quantile-probability plots and the HDDM quantified the impact of MDD on response times (RT), speed of evidence accumulation (drift rate), and the width of decision thresholds, among other parameters.

RTs were more positively skewed in depressed v. healthy adults, and the HDDM revealed that drift rates were reduced—and decision thresholds were wider—in the MDD groups. This pattern suggests that depressed adults accumulated the evidence needed to make decisions more slowly than controls did.

Depressed adults responded slower than controls in both studies, and poorer performance led the MDD group to receive fewer rewards than controls in Study 1. These results did not reflect a sensorimotor deficit but were instead due to sluggish evidence accumulation. Thus, slowed decision-making—not slowed perception or response execution—caused the performance deficit in MDD. If these results generalize to other tasks, they may help explain the broad cognitive deficits seen in depression.

Mood and anxiety disorders are ubiquitous but current treatment options are ineffective for many sufferers. Moreover, a number of promising pre-clinical interventions have failed to translate into clinical efficacy in humans. Improved treatments are unlikely without better animal–human translational pipelines. Here, we translate a rodent measure of negative affective bias into humans, exploring its relationship with (1) pathological mood and anxiety symptoms and (2) transient induced anxiety.

Adult participants (age = 29 ± 11) who met criteria for mood or anxiety disorder symptomatology according to a face-to-face neuropsychiatric interview were included in the symptomatic group. Study 1 included N = 77 (47 = asymptomatic [female = 21]; 30 = symptomatic [female = 25]), study 2 included N = 47 asymptomatic participants (25 = female). Outcome measures were choice ratios, reaction times and parameters recovered from a computational model of reaction time – the drift diffusion model (DDM) – from a two-alternative-forced-choice task in which ambiguous and unambiguous auditory stimuli were paired with high and low rewards.

Both groups showed over 93% accuracy on unambiguous tones indicating intact discrimination, but symptomatic individuals demonstrated increased negative affective bias on ambiguous tones [proportion high reward = 0.42 (s.d. = 0.14)] relative to asymptomatic individuals [0.53 (s.d. = 0.17)] as well as a significantly reduced DDM drift rate. No significant effects were observed for the within-subjects anxiety-induction.

Humans with pathological anxiety symptoms directly mimic rodents undergoing anxiogenic manipulation. The lack of sensitivity to transient anxiety suggests the paradigm might be more sensitive to clinically relevant symptoms. Our results establish a direct translational pipeline (and candidate therapeutics screen) from negative affective bias in rodents to pathological mood and anxiety symptoms in humans.