Chapter 2 fully develops the overarching theoretical framework of the book. It first specifies a comprehensive theory as to why electoral authoritarianism tends to be the most preferred remedy for popular majorities living in troubled societies. It then moves on to define the specific rhetorical template and campaign strategy – what I describe as the elected strongman appeal – that electoral authoritarian incumbents use to press their advantage and win favor in populations distraught by turmoil. Finally, Chapter 2 develops a full theory of electoral competition in societies that have experienced deep, traumatic crises. This segment traces how justifying electoral authoritarianism as a strong-armed response to a national emergency enables authoritarian parties and leaders to achieve a genuine popularity advantage over their opponents, and to secure power through the ballot box and with minimal coercion.

Chapter 5 introduces the analysis of popular opinion in electoral autocracies with a comparative analysis of the paradigmatic case of Russia. The chapter first outlines the scope and consequences of Russia’s catastrophic post-Communist cataclysm, and how this traumatic experience prompted ordinary Russians to place an absolute premium on restoring order and stability – outlooks that made Vladimir Putin’s tough-mannered style of governing incredibly popular. Using a uniquely rich dataset of 418 surveys for the 1993-2011 period, produced by Russia’s Levada Center, this chapter demonstrates that in societies traumatized by upheaval, the strongman appeal trumps ideological, programmatic, and value orientations, and aligns mass opinion and political competition along a new cleavage: the choice of whether to accept or reject electoral authoritarianism as a regime that can impose order. I show that this cleavage inhibits and divides the opposition and highlights its shortcomings, allowing even weakly performing autocracies to retain power through elections.