Political technology' is not a term much used in the West. But spin and political consulting are outdated labels. Spin doctors and political consultants do more than spin or consult; they also meet the definition of engineers of the political system. Particularly in the United States, where a different type of political universe has been constructed: Political Action Committees, dark money and astroturfing.

Given growing worry about dark money electoral spending and covert forms of business lobbying – neither of which generally require federal reporting – a shareholder-activist movement has emerged to pressure companies to increase their voluntary political disclosures. This chapter investigates how companies are pressured for greater disclosure and how they respond. I find that firms are likely to be targeted if they are larger and more prominent, and engage in higher levels of conventional lobbying and electoral spending. Additional qualitative evidence shows that targeting follows from a firm’s receptivity to engagement and also if their spending appears contradictory to corporate values. Lastly, I investigate the likelihood that shareholder activism is successful, finding that apparent concessions are more likely after repeated targeting and during years of S&P 500 index constituency. The chapter draws conclusions about the prospects for greater transparency of corporate political expenditures in a time of uncertain government oversight.

This chapter examines the role of disclosure as a tool for promoting corporate political accountability by reviewing how shareholders reacted to various events in the United States and abroad that either changed the ability of firms to engage in the political process or revealed previously hidden corporate political activity. The conclusions drawn from this summary are mixed, with investors’ reactions contingent on myriad factors, including the form of the political activity engaged in, prior contestation over such activity by shareholders, and other firm-level nonmarket and market dynamics. The chapter concludes by discussing the limits of disclosure as a tool for regulating corporate political activity, as well as public policy more broadly, and advocates for broader, institutional reforms regarding the role of money in politics.

This chapter looks at why the UK was so lacking in resilience when COVID-19 struck. It will examine the corrosive narrative of neoliberalism, which holds that the state is an unwelcome intrusion into people’s lives and the economy, showing how the resulting deregulation and financialisation of the economy replaced productive value creation with exploitative value extraction.

It will detail the cronyism that built up as a relationship of mutual dependence between politicians and the wealthy developed and describe the lack of transparency as pandemic contracts were let that racked up enormous bills but often failed to deliver, spectacularly so in the case of the £37 billion track and trace system.

It will then examine the public spending cuts and damaging reorganisation of the NHS and public health functions after 2012, which left the sector unable to respond effectively to COVID-19. In the rush to free up beds, 25,000 elderly people were discharged into care homes with instructions that negative COVID-19 tests were ‘not required’. Deaths in care homes in the pandemic became a national scandal, both COVID-19 deaths and many other ‘unexpected’ deaths as a result of what appeared to be a systematic withdrawal of normal medical care.