The paper investigates from a proof-theoretic perspective various non-contractive logical systems, which circumvent logical and semantic paradoxes. Until recently, such systems only displayed additive quantifiers (Grišin and Cantini). Systems with multiplicative quantifiers were proposed in the 2010s (Zardini), but they turned out to be inconsistent with the naive rules for truth or comprehension. We start by presenting a first-order system for disquotational truth with additive quantifiers and compare it with Grišin set theory. We then analyze the reasons behind the inconsistency phenomenon affecting multiplicative quantifiers. After interpreting the exponentials in affine logic as vacuous quantifiers, we show how such a logic can be simulated within a truth-free fragment of a system with multiplicative quantifiers. Finally, we establish that the logic for these multiplicative quantifiers (but without disquotational truth) is consistent, by proving that an infinitary version of the cut rule can be eliminated. This paves the way to a syntactic approach to the proof theory of infinitary logic with infinite sequents.

Linear logic (LL) has been used as a foundation (and inspiration) for the development of programming languages, logical frameworks, and models for concurrency. LL’s cut-elimination and the completeness of focusing are two of its fundamental properties that have been exploited in such applications. This paper formalizes the proof of cut-elimination for focused LL. For that, we propose a set of five cut-rules that allows us to prove cut-elimination directly on the focused system. We also encode the inference rules of other logics as LL theories and formalize the necessary conditions for those logics to have cut-elimination. We then obtain, for free, cut-elimination for first-order classical, intuitionistic, and variants of LL. We also use the LL metatheory to formalize the relative completeness of natural deduction and sequent calculus in first-order minimal logic. Hence, we propose a framework that can be used to formalize fundamental properties of logical systems specified as LL theories.

A sequent calculus with the subformula property has long been recognised as a highly favourable starting point for the proof theoretic investigation of a logic. However, most logics of interest cannot be presented using a sequent calculus with the subformula property. In response, many formalisms more intricate than the sequent calculus have been formulated. In this work we identify an alternative: retain the sequent calculus but generalise the subformula property to permit specific axiom substitutions and their subformulas. Our investigation leads to a classification of generalised subformula properties and is applied to infinitely many substructural, intermediate, and modal logics (specifically: those with a cut-free hypersequent calculus). We also develop a complementary perspective on the generalised subformula properties in terms of logical embeddings. This yields new complexity upper bounds for contractive-mingle substructural logics and situates isolated results on the so-called simple substitution property within a general theory.

We present a sequent calculus for the Grzegorczyk modal logic $\mathsf {Grz}$ allowing cyclic and other non-well-founded proofs and obtain the cut-elimination theorem for it by constructing a continuous cut-elimination mapping acting on these proofs. As an application, we establish the Lyndon interpolation property for the logic $\mathsf {Grz}$ proof-theoretically.

Any set of truth-functional connectives has sequent calculus rules that can be generated systematically from the truth tables of the connectives. Such a sequent calculus gives rise to a multi-conclusion natural deduction system and to a version of Parigot’s free deduction. The elimination rules are “general,” but can be systematically simplified. Cut-elimination and normalization hold. Restriction to a single formula in the succedent yields intuitionistic versions of these systems. The rules also yield generalized lambda calculi providing proof terms for natural deduction proofs as in the Curry–Howard isomorphism. Addition of an indirect proof rule yields classical single-conclusion versions of these systems. Gentzen’s standard systems arise as special cases.

This note shows that the permutation instructions presented by Zardini (2011) for eliminating cuts on universally quantified formulas in the sequent calculus for the noncontractive theory of truth IKTω are inadequate. To that purpose the note presents a derivation in the sequent calculus for IKTω ending with an application of cut on a universally quantified formula which the permutation instructions cannot deal with. The counterexample is of the kind that leaves open the question whether cut can be shown to be eliminable in the sequent calculus for IKTω with an alternative strategy.

Herbrand’s theorem is one of the most fundamental insights in logic. From the syntactic point of view, it suggests a compact representation of proofs in classical first- and higher-order logics by recording the information of which instances have been chosen for which quantifiers. This compact representation is known in the literature as Miller’s expansion tree proof. It is inherently analytic and hence corresponds to a cut-free sequent calculus proof. Recently several extensions of such proof representations to proofs with cuts have been proposed. These extensions are based on graphical formalisms similar to proof nets and are limited to prenex formulas.

In this paper, we present a new syntactic approach that directly extends Miller’s expansion trees by cuts and also covers non-prenex formulas. We describe a cut-elimination procedure for our expansion trees with cut that is based on the natural reduction steps and shows that it is weakly normalizing.

We present novel proof systems for various FDE-based modal logics. Among the systems considered are a number of Belnapian modal logics introduced in Odintsov & Wansing (2010) and Odintsov & Wansing (2017), as well as the modal logic KN4 with strong implication introduced in Goble (2006). In particular, we provide a Hilbert-style axiom system for the logic $BK^{\square - } $ and characterize the logic BK as an axiomatic extension of the system $BK^{FS} $. For KN4 we provide both an FDE-style axiom system and a decidable sequent calculus for which a contraction elimination and a cut elimination result are shown.

We present abstract complexity results about Coquand and Hyland–Ong game semantics, that will lead to new bounds on the length of first-order cut-elimination, normalization, interaction between expansion trees and any other dialogical process game semantics can model and apply to. In particular, we provide a novel method to bound the length of interactions between visible strategies and to measure precisely the tower of exponentials defining the worst-case complexity. Our study improves the old estimates on average by several exponentials.

We build on an existing a term-sequent logic for the λ-calculus. We formulate a general sequent system that fully integrates αβη-reductions between untyped λ-terms into first order logic.

We prove a cut-elimination result and then offer an application of cut-elimination by giving a notion of uniform proof for λ-terms. We suggest how this allows us to view the calculus of untyped αβ-reductions as a logic programming language (as well as a functional programming language, as it is traditionally seen).

Evidence is given that implication (and its special case, negation) carry the logical strength of a system of formal logic. This is done by proving normalization and cut elimination for a system based on combinatory logic or λ-calculus with logical constants for and, or, all, and exists, but with none for either implication or negation. The proof is strictly finitary, showing that this system is very weak. The results can be extended to a “classical” version of the system. They can also be extended to a system with a restricted set of rules for implication: the result is a system of intuitionistic higher-order BCK logic with unrestricted comprehension and without restriction on the rules for disjunction elimination and existential elimination. The result does not extend to the classical version of the BCK logic.