Referring to the title of the first part of this volume – ‘setting the framework’ – Immi Tallgren explains that there is not one framework in which the ‘why punish’ question can be asked. Instead different frames are required to draw attention to the plurality of perspectives that could be taken on international punishment. Thus, in her comment, Tallgren pictures the landscape in which ‘why punish’ is asked and thereby sheds light on the contexts of that context of knowledge, its production, reproduction and subjectivities. While sketching out these frames – the frame of law, the frame of criminology, the moral frame, the frame of ‘fantasmatic logic’ and the frame of politics – Tallgren makes visible the outside of the chapters ‘setting the framework’ and discusses what aspects of the ‘why punish’ question are missing in this volume, and whose voice is excluded from our debate.

Frank Neubacher looks at theories of punishment in international criminal law from a criminologist's perspective. He addresses three interconnected issues: The purpose of punishment, the explanation of international crimes, and sentencing. As regards the former, he is a strong advocate of a combination of different preventive theories as rationale for (international) punishment, but adds elements of restorative justice. Regarding the explanation of international crimes, he distinguishes three levels: the macro-, meso- and micro-level, connected to the system, the group and the individual, respectively. For Neubacher, it is most important to emphasize that collective violence, in which international crimes are being committed, is a situational process. He explains that when it comes to mass atrocities the perpetrator’s behaviour is illegal, but socially not deviant. Finally, as regards the reaction to international crimes, Neubacher explains that for a deterrent effect to ensue, the certainty of punishment is decisive, not the severity. Regarding the sentencing decisions, he sees a disregard of the individual perpetrator’s circumstances and proposes a more nuanced model of liability (and, thus, culpability) which takes into account the hierarchical position of the perpetrators as well as his or her discretional power.