Scholars of global constitutionalism have recently come to examine international criminal law (ICL) and its associated institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court (the ICC). This article prolongs these efforts by pointing to and remedying two deficits of that project with particular emphasis on the Rome Statute crimes. First, how does one account for the role of the international trial in global constitutionalist terms? Second, can global constitutionalism insightfully explain the content and scope of these crimes – that is, both their substantive definition and the predominant modes of liability developed by the ICC? This article answers both questions affirmatively and offers an account of their nexus. It first shows that the Rome Statute crimes are often perpetrated through a hierarchically organized apparatus of control, and interprets their global constitutional significance via the principle of constituent power. It then makes use of Antony Duff’s relational account of criminal liability to offer an account of the international trial. In the international context, one can conceive of the trial as allowing state or state-like authorities to call each other to account, which renders justice to the core function of enabling and limiting political authority on which global constitutionalism centres.

Within the criminal justice system, there is always a balancing act between two conflicting tenets: incarcerating the prisoners as a preventive measure, on the one hand, and, on the other, aiming to rehabilitate them. Without a proper transition, it is possible that prisoners will reoffend upon release. German legislation allows corrections officers to grant relaxed terms of imprisonment to prisoners who have proved themselves suitable. However, on June 7, 2018, corrections officers were essentially deprived of this power when the Regional Court of Limburg convicted two corrections officers of negligent killing after a prisoner, to whom they had granted relaxed terms of imprisonment, killed someone during one of his periods of release. In the immediate wake of this controversial judgment, corrections officers throughout Germany were seemingly left with two options: either to remain conscientious and attempt to rehabilitate the prisoners with the underlying risk of being subject to prosecution themselves, or to ensure their own “safety”, thereby jeopardizing prisoners’ crime-free futures. This article provides an overview regarding negligently committed offenses under German law, analyzes what led the trial court to this radical decision, and assesses why the final appeal court overruled the Regional Court’s decision.

L’article R. 4456-1 du code du travail fait obligation au chef d’établissement de désigner au moins une personne compétente en radioprotection (PCR). Bien que les prérogatives de celle-ci soient exercées sous la responsabilité du chef d’établissement, les règles traditionnelles de mise en cause de la responsabilité s’appliquent aussi bien au chef d’établissement qu’à la PCR. Qu’il s’agisse de la responsabilité civile, dont l’objet est de garantir la réparation d’un dommage par son auteur, ou de la responsabilité pénale, qui vise à sanctionner un comportement répréhensible, la PCR n’échappe pas à ces règles de droit commun qui, toutefois, s’appliquent de manière particulière compte tenu de ses missions quotidiennes. Si la responsabilité de l’employeur est davantage mise en cause, notamment du fait de l’autorité qu’il exerce sur son employé, la PCR ne doit pas être considérée comme irresponsable sur les plans civil et pénal puisqu’elle est susceptible d’être mise en cause par un salarié victime d’un dommage. L’activité de la PCR – et donc les cas permettant l’engagement de sa responsabilité – repose largement sur les moyens dont elle dispose et le contexte dans lequel elle exerce sa mission. Le juge tient d’ailleurs largement compte des ressources dont dispose un agent pour juger de sa responsabilité. Dès lors, les relations de la PCR avec les autres acteurs de la radioprotection, internes ou externes à l’établissement, sont déterminantes.

This article considers the suitability of employing particular modes of imputed criminal liability in trials before international criminal tribunals. It focuses specifically on the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and superior responsibility, two forms of liability which are central to many contemporary international criminal proceedings. Both doctrines can involve a broad form of criminal liability which may not be entirely appropriate when one considers the context in which such trials take place and the significance which often attaches to them. Proponents of international justice have contended that the contribution of these trials goes beyond basic accountability and providing justice for victims, extending also to peacemaking, reconciliation, deterrence, and the creation of a historical record. This article queries whether aspects of joint criminal enterprise liability and superior responsibility are appropriate when international justice is viewed in this light.