The slow or negative growth rates combined with high rates of inflation in the 1970s led to strong reactions. These reactions would give more power to the market while reducing that of governments. Various economic theories, some new and some rediscovered old ones, were advanced, to call for a reduced government role. Some of these were the Ricardian equivalence, rational expectations, Laffer Curve, efficient markets, effects of high compensations on some individuals, impact of globalization, etc. The new environment made some very conservative politicians win elections, in the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, and some other countries. The era of welfare states was over and that of market fundamentalism had arrived. Future years would be different from past ones. To some exient it would be a return to laissez faire.

The age of Atlantic revolutions brought hope for fundamental change, a scarce good in the early modern world. Change was achieved through the creation and legal incorporation of rights, which differed from privileges, as they transcended all structures of authority and were thus common to humankind. Yet inequalities persisted, especially inequality of property and religion. What did change was the ability to voice one’s opinion. Slogans used in national debates were utilized by people across social boundaries in countless local settings to express their political views or personal interests. This instrumentalization in turn reverberated on the national level. To succeed in achieving political goals, the mobilization of public opinion became indispensable. Likewise, revolutionaries agreed that the regimes they built had to be supported by some form of popular control over the government. But the actual people – rather than the abstract one that was a source of legitimacy – was feared nonetheless. Most new regimes were republics, while royalists tended to uphold the status quo or pursue their goals without overthrowing the government, although royalism did not necessarily denote a progressive or conservative ideology.

The age of Atlantic revolutions brought hope for fundamental change, a scarce good in the early modern world. Change was achieved through the creation and legal incorporation of rights, which differed from privileges, as they transcended all structures of authority and were thus common to humankind. Yet inequalities persisted, especially inequality of property and religion. What did change was the ability to voice one’s opinion. Slogans used in national debates were utilized by people across social boundaries in countless local settings to express their political views or personal interests. This instrumentalization in turn reverberated on the national level. To succeed in achieving political goals, the mobilization of public opinion became indispensable. Likewise, revolutionaries agreed that the regimes they built had to be supported by some form of popular control over the government. But the actual people – rather than the abstract one that was a source of legitimacy – was feared nonetheless. Most new regimes were republics, while royalists tended to uphold the status quo or pursue their goals without overthrowing the government, although royalism did not necessarily denote a progressive or conservative ideology.

The reinstallation of liberal constitutionalism in Spain in 1820 was the first major challenge to the conservative political system of the Restoration, with far-reaching effects on the European and American continents. Spanish liberals endeavored to continue a political program based on the constitution of Cádiz (1812), although they encountered many obstacles in the form of inner discord and, especially, a local robust counterrevolutionary movement which enjoyed external support. The Trieno Constitucional was a moment of rapid and intense politicization, which surpassed the social elites to reach into a wider public that included popular sectors. A vigorous public opinion was developed and elections with mass participation were held at various administrative levels. The reverberations of the Spanish revolution were felt abroad. Naples-Sicily, Portugal and Piedmont-Sardinia soon adopted the Cádiz constitution. Moreover, during the Triennium the American possessions of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies secured their independence, at a critical moment in which the Iberian metropoles were unable to delay the process anymore. Ultimately, the return of liberalism to Southern Europe was short-lived. The constitutional regimes fell after interventions accorded by the continental powers endorsed the local reactionary interests.

Violence helps to define revolution as a mode of historical change; however, violence is a factor, not an actor, in history. Widespread violence in a variety of forms persisted in France despite three constitutions (1791, 1795, 1799) and their accompanying claims to end the Revolution. The popular violence that began in 1789 helped to eliminate the vestiges of feudalism and abolish inherited privilege. In 1792, rural revolts, urban riots, and foreign war served to bring down the monarchy and promote social leveling. Dismantling the old order provoked widespread resistance, which inspired state-authorized terror, exceptional justice, and mass executions on an unprecedented scale in 1793-94. Royalism, Jacobinism, religious resistance, continuing war, and politicized vigilantism all fueled continuing cycles of violence after 1794. Economic chaos, parlous policing, and partisan judges also prolonged an endemic violence that ranged from solipsistic banditry to armed counter-revolution. These multivalent forces of instability could only be tamed by enhancing and depoliticizing the repressive powers of the state. Efforts both to ensconce the republic and contain violence, notably by militarizing justice, enhancing repression, and limiting democracy, spawned a growing liberal authoritarianism after 1797. Reducing factionalism, banditry, and regional resistance fostered a security state and personal dictatorship in 1802.

The age of Atlantic revolutions brought hope for fundamental change, a scarce good in the early modern world. Change was achieved through the creation and legal incorporation of rights, which differed from privileges, as they transcended all structures of authority and were thus common to humankind. Yet inequalities persisted, especially inequality of property and religion. What did change was the ability to voice one’s opinion. Slogans used in national debates were utilized by people across social boundaries in countless local settings to express their political views or personal interests. This instrumentalization in turn reverberated on the national level. To succeed in achieving political goals, the mobilization of public opinion became indispensable. Likewise, revolutionaries agreed that the regimes they built had to be supported by some form of popular control over the government. But the actual people – rather than the abstract one that was a source of legitimacy – was feared nonetheless. Most new regimes were republics, while royalists tended to uphold the status quo or pursue their goals without overthrowing the government, although royalism did not necessarily denote a progressive or conservative ideology.

This chapter analyzes rumor and terror, both shaped by revolutionary scripts, and the political violence that erupted after the creation of council governments. These new governments, namesakes of the revolutionary government in Russia, deployed a revolutionary vocabulary that seemed to make concrete all the ideas of radical political discourse. Rhetoric about class warfare appeared to transform into reality with the appearance of armed workers' brigades patrolling the streets. This embodiment of previously theoretical concepts was empowering to those playing the roles of revolutionary heroes and was terrifying to those who suddenly found themselves cast as enemies in a dramatic new reality. As we explore events in Budapest and Munich we will see how expectations of violence shaped by revolutionary scripts influenced the ways in which residents of the two cities understood political events and provoked new rounds of violence.

This chapter explores evolving regional dynamics first through an examination of the relationship between Iran’s revolution and its foreign policy. It proceeds to analyse the Islamic Republic’s efforts to export revolution and the underpinnings of Iran’s burgeoning alignment with Syria. The second half of the chapter focusses on the other Arab states’ efforts to contain the revolution, including through manipulating state–society relations, before moving on to examine the role of the anti-Soviet ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan in the hegemonic strategies of regional states.