This introduction to the symposium ‘How do Constitution-Making Processes Fail? The Case of Chile’s Constitutional Convention (2021–22)’ situates the project in the field of constitution-making, provides context regarding the Chilean case, summarizes some possible explanations for the failure, and describes how each article contributes to the symposium as a whole.

This article extends the study of the shortcomings of the constitution-making design that contributed to the failure of the Chilean process by addressing a largely overlooked aspect: the 2020 entry referendum. By placing two competing constitution-making models on the ballot, the political elites delegated to the voters a highly conflictual aspect of the process design that prevented cooperation among them. While some political parties approached the disagreements placed on the ballot as an opportunity to reopen discussions already settled by the 2019 Agreement, others interpreted the move as a cancellation of the political insurance contained in the Agreement. This exacerbated the existing polarization among political elites and imperiled prospects for the success of the process.

Power of state – President as state's and as people's representative – Bicephalism of government – Unity in cabinet – History – Guizot, Chateaubriand – Orleanism – President's arbitration is form of leadership – De Gaulle engaging political responsibility – penal responsibility – Cohabitation – Constitutional amendment and referendum (1962) – President structures parliamentary majority – Weakness of Parliament – Full presidentialization? – Sixth Republic?