Francesco Berto proposed a logic for imaginative episodes. The logic establishes certain (in)validities concerning episodic imagination. They are not all equally plausible as principles of episodic imagination. The logic also does not model that the initial input of an imaginative episode is deliberately chosen. Stit-imagination logic models the imagining agent’s deliberate choice of the content of their imagining. However, the logic does not model the episodic nature of imagination. The present paper combines the two logics, thereby modelling imaginative episodes with deliberately chosen initial input. We use a combination of stit-imagination logic and a content-sensitive variably strict conditional à la Berto, for which we give a Chellas–Segerberg semantics. The proposed semantics has the following advantages over Berto’s: (i) we model the deliberate choice of initial input of imaginative episodes (in a multi-agent setting), (ii) we show frame correspondences for axiomatic analogues of Berto’s validities, which (iii) allows the possibility to disregard axioms that might be considered not plausible as principles concerning imaginative episodes. We do not take a definite stance on whether these should be disregarded but give reasons for why one might want to disregard them. Finally, we compare our semantics briefly with recent work, which aims to model voluntary imagination, and argue that our semantics models different aspects.

We prove completeness of preferential conditional logic with respect to convexity over finite sets of points in the Euclidean plane. A conditional is defined to be true in a finite set of points if all extreme points of the set interpreting the antecedent satisfy the consequent. Equivalently, a conditional is true if the antecedent is contained in the convex hull of the points that satisfy both the antecedent and consequent. Our result is then that every consistent formula without nested conditionals is satisfiable in a model based on a finite set of points in the plane. The proof relies on a result by Richter and Rogers showing that every finite abstract convex geometry can be represented by convex polygons in the plane.

In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona proposed an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic.

We present four classical theories of counterpossibles that combine modalities and counterfactuals. Two theories are anti-vacuist and forbid vacuously true counterfactuals, two are quasi-vacuist and allow counterfactuals to be vacuously true when their antecedent is not only impossible, but also inconceivable. The theories vary on how they restrict the interaction of modalities and counterfactuals. We provide a logical cartography with precise acceptable boundaries, illustrating to what extent nonvacuism about counterpossibles can be reconciled with classical logic.