It is commonly held that Darwin discovered natural selection in a flash of insight after reading Thomas Robert Malthus’ Essay on Population in September 1838. Additionally, most people think this was the missing piece that completed his theory of evolution. However, the Eureka moment is a myth, as is the claim that its purported insight finalized his theoretical understanding. Darwin not only slowly worked out his idea of natural selection over many months but he also took another twenty years to formulate the theory presented in On the Origin of Species. Most notably, his thinking changed radically in 1856 with the introduction of the principle of divergence. Analyzing this history demonstrates that there are a variety of misunderstandings about what exactly Darwin’s theory was, how it was structured, and whether it changed over time. Overall, this casts doubt on the claim that Darwin’s theory was ever “essentially complete,” even after contemplating several different meanings for this phrase. Rejecting this myth yields a richer understanding of the way scientific inquiry operates, especially how its methods and outcomes are justified, while augmenting our confidence in the importance of natural selection for explaining adaptive evolution.

Chapter 3 goes back to Skinner’s “rhetorical turn” and the paradoxical consequences of it. As it shows, Skinner will focus exclusive on one rhetorical figure: paradiastole, which became at once an object and a heuristic tool. It is connected with his perspective of conceptual change as a form of transvaluation. This leads, in turn, to distinguish between the “reproducers of ideology” and the “innovators of ideology,” and posit the latter as the demiurges of conceptual change. At that juncture, there appears the figure of the “author.” Yet, as is shows, it is contradictory with the theoretical premises he established. At that point, we can observe the collapse of his original proposal of a “discursive contextualist” approach. Lastly, this leads his view to relapse into the dualism between “ideas” and “reality” proper to the traditional history of ideas that he intended then to counter.

Chapter 21 concludes with a discussion of the ways in which professional development opportunities can contribute to bridging the gap between theory and practice in language learning. The authors present individual and collaborative practices, as well as internal and external experiences that educators may seek out to deepen their conceptual understanding and practical skills.

This chapter considers an unusual cognitive category, which pertains to a kind of process rather than a kind of entity, state, or capacity, namely language-thought processes. The kind of process in question is often discussed in the cognitive science literature under the headings of “linguistic relativity” and “linguistic determinism.” These labels aim to identify a distinctive type of cognitive process, all of whose instances share something important in common, namely a fundamental or deep-seated influence of language on thought. By looking at some paradigmatic cases, I argue that there is nothing to distinguish this type of process from a broader cognitive phenomenon, namely concept acquisition or conceptual change. Moreover, within this broader category, there are two distinct kinds of process that are usually lumped together but that do not seem to have anything significant in common. There is an important difference between those processes that involve simultaneous recruitment of linguistic capacities and those that do not. These two types of process may constitute distinct cognitive kinds within the broader cognitive kind of concept acquisition or conceptual change.

Microgenetic methods are used to analyze moment-to-moment processes of learning, reasoning, and problem-solving. Microgenetic methods are useful when studying learning that does not occur in a straight line from lesser to greater understanding, but rather occurs through a learning trajectory that includes iterative and unpredictable paths and sometimes even setbacks or failure. Microgenetic methods are also useful in studying learning that is mediated by tools and artifacts in the learning environment, and what role those artifacts play in the developing learning trajectory. These methods are time-consuming and it’s not practical to conduct studies with large sample sizes or that occur over very long periods of time; rather, the focus is on developing a deep and thorough understanding of a specific learning environment and then to generalize those findings to a broader range of contexts. Microgenetic methods are particularly well-suited to five types of research questions: questions about the variability or stability of strategies; events that precipitate or initiate change; co-occurring events and processes; trajectories or paths of change; and the rate of change.

This chapter begins by describing what is unique about mathematics that has made it a central topic in the learning sciences. This research has historically been interdisciplinary, drawing on psychology, mathematics research and theory, and mathematics educators. It then describes two distinct approaches – the acquisitionist and the participationist. The acquisitionist approach considers learning to be what happens when an individual learner acquires mathematical knowledge. This part of the chapter reviews research on misconceptions and conceptual change that has been based in Piaget’s constructivist theories. The participationist approach views learning as originating in social interactions in diverse settings such as classrooms, homes and playgrounds, museums, and workplaces. This approach views learning as a collective sociocultural phenomenon, and uses methodologies such as interaction analysis and design-based research. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how teachers learn to teach mathematics.

Effective learning requires conceptual change: learning new and correct knowledge while also overcoming and transforming previously held incorrect knowledge. These incorrect conceptions prevent deep learning unless they are transformed into correct ones. These early, common-sense, and incorrect beliefs are sometimes called naïve theories. Most of the research in this chapter concerns physics, biology, and math learning. Jean Piaget’s theoretical work provides an important foundation for conceptual change research, as well as theories in the history and philosophy of science about how scientific disciplines change over time. The author presents a knowledge in pieces theory of how conceptual change occurs during learning.

This chapter examines the influence of Conant on Kuhn's thinking about science. I identify five key elements that Kuhn did not get from Conant, including the notions of normal science and paradigm.

Where contemporary thinkers well disposed towards Rorty tend to emphasize the significance of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, more skeptical voices are apt to impugn his relevance to ongoing debates in philosophy on the grounds that that work’s attempt to dispose of the traditional conception of the discipline in the name of a nebulous “literary criticism” is little more than an exercise in self-therapy. The contention of this chapter, then, is that the antagonism this emphasis generates is both unfruitful and ill-conceived. Taking as its starting point reactions to criticism of his early (eliminativist) materialism, it argues that Rorty’s work in the 1970s offers a vindication of the activity of traditional philosophy, albeit within the broader conception of intellectual inquiry we’ve come to call neopragmatism and – latterly – “cultural politics.” From this perspective, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity is just one (perhaps self-revealing) prophetic-theoretical proposal amongst many that neopragmatism/philosophy-as-cultural-politics makes possible. But that in turn shows how important this period of Rorty’s work is, not only to understanding his later output but also to elucidating the options available to contemporary philosophy.