Gender recognition is a crucial achievement for non-binary people. To better understand this right, this article combines comparative law with theoretical insights from anthropology to offer a discussion of non-binary recognition in European fundamental rights law. It identifies three approaches to such a right and critically assesses each of them. The first approach is denial, with the non-binary option being explicitly or implicitly rejected, as has occurred in French and Italian courts. The next approach is limited recognition, whereby a non-binary option is granted under specific limitations, such as when certain physical characteristics are present or when a claimant permanently identifies with the non-binary gender. This is the course of action that has been taken in German law. The third approach is gender self-determination, whereby individuals can obtain recognition on the basis of their declaration alone. This solution has been offered by the Belgian Constitutional Court. On the strength of findings from anthropology, the article argues that the first two models are incapable of genuinely engaging with gender diversity, while the third one offers more robust legal protection. The analysis presented here serves as an example of how anthropological insights can be effectively used to advance comparative law research.

The idea of investment treaty arbitration as public law is in tension with the concept of international law as a law between representative public agencies. This concept of international law is valuable for its capacity to progress a broad range of public policy aims in an integrated and coordinated manner, including aims extending beyond the economic sphere such as international social, environmental, cultural and related aims. The probable effect on this concept of international law of a radical ‘internationalized public law’ approach to investment treaty arbitration requires further thought, especially with regard to the potential implications of recognizing investor rights under international law.

This article analyses the source, nature, and use of unilateral, non-statutory executive powers, frequently employed as a governance tool but rarely studied in a comparative context. Exercised in the absence of direct statutory authorization, such powers are often invoked by executives in emergency and foreign affairs contexts, but are equally central to domestic policy-making. Unilateral executive power challenges two central democratic values that support the separation of powers ideal: representation and deliberation. Different structural treatments of these powers are considered through a comparison of three constitutional regimes, those of the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. Despite material structural differences between these systems, the emerging patterns are similar enough to support the argument that direct law-making by the executive is an unavoidable element of the political sphere. Developing a template for comparison analysis, this article shows that a pattern of functional convergence has emerged, unsupported by overt transplantation or borrowing between these systems. The results set a possible challenge to the growing recognition of global world constitutionalism, at least in structural-institutional contexts.

EU Financial responsibility resulting from investor-state arbitration is a politically sensitive topic that is currently shaping the emerging European international investment policy. What level of protection can foreign investors be granted in future EU investment treaties without compromising EU ‘policy space’? How much review of its regulatory powers by arbitral tribunals, rather than by the CJEU, is the EU willing to accept? Taking the Commission's recent draft Regulation on managing financial responsibility as the starting point, this article analyses the implications that future EU investment agreements may have for the existing safeguards balancing private and public interests in EU law. It discusses the different policy choices in the light of fears that investment treaties may affect the EU policy space. A more scientific and sustainable approach is then suggested for ensuring that future EU agreements provide sufficient clarity regarding the outer bounds of financial responsibility and criteria for liability with the aim of maximizing legal certainty for both investors and host states.