We estimate the effects of repeated exposure to the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) by examining 14,053 MTurk subjects who took the test up to 25 times. In contrast with inferences drawn from self-reported prior exposure to the CRT, we find that prior exposure usually fails to improve scores. On average, respondents get only 0.024 additional items correct per exposure, and this small increase is driven entirely by the minority of subjects who continue to spend time reflecting on the items. Moreover, later scores retain the predictive validity of earlier scores, even when they differ, because initial success and later improvement appear to measure the same thing.

Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives—more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.

While previous studies reveal mixed findings on the relationship between analytic cognitive style (ACS) and right-wing (conservative) political orientation, the correlation is generally negative. However, most of these studies are based on Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and it is not clear whether this relationship is a cross-culturally stable phenomenon. In order to test cross-cultural generalizability of this finding, we re-analyzed the data collected by the Many Labs 2 Project from 30 politically diverse societies (N = 7,263). Social conservatism is measured with the binding foundations scale, comprising of loyalty (patriotism), authority (respect for traditions), and sanctity (respect for the sacred), as proposed by the moral foundations theory, while ACS is measured by the three-item modified cognitive reflection task. The level of WEIRDness of each country was calculated by scoring how much a culture is Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. Although social conservatism is negatively associated with ACS in the aggregate, analysis indicates that the relationship is significantly stronger among WEIRD and remains negligible among non-WEIRD cultures. These findings show the cross-cultural variability of this relationship and emphasize the limitations of studying only WEIRD cultures.

The present research investigated the reason for mixed evidence concerning the relationship between analytic cognitive style (ACS) and political orientation in previous research. Most past research operationalized ACS with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which has been criticized as relying heavily on numeracy skills, and operationalized political orientation with the single-item self-placement measure, which has been criticized as masking the distinction between social and economic conservatism. The present research recruited an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample and, for the first time, simultaneously employed three separate ACS measures (CRT, CRT2, Baserate conflict problems), a measure of attitudes toward self-critical and reflective thinking (the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale; AOT), and separate measures of social and economic conservatism, as well the standard measure of political orientation. As expected, the total ACS score (combination of the separate measures) was negatively related to social, but not economic, conservatism. However, the CRT by itself was not related to conservatism, in parallel with some past findings, while the two other measures of ACS showed the same pattern as the combined score. Trait reflectiveness (AOT) was related negatively to all measures of political conservatism (social, economic, and general). Results clearly suggest that the conclusion reached regarding the ACS-political orientation relationship depends on the measure(s) used, with the measure most commonly employed in past research (CRT) behaving differently than other measures. Future research must further pursue the implications of the known differences (e.g., reliance on numeracy vs. verbal skills) of ACS measures and distinguish different senses of reflectiveness.

We asked whether behavioral biases are related to cognitive abilities of Malaysian youth. Frederick’s three-item Cognitive Reflection Test was used to understand the role of behavioral biases concerning behavioral economics and finance. The sample (n = 880) comprised of university students from different parts of Malaysia. We found significant CRT differences as a function of gender, race and age groups. In addition, lower scores on the CRT are correlated positively with time preference and conservatism, but not with risk preference or the conjunction fallacy.

A widely used measure of individual propensity to utilize analytic processing is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a set of math problems with intuitively compelling but incorrect answers. Here, we ask whether scores on this measure are temporally stable. We aggregate data from 11 studies run on Amazon Mechanical Turk in which the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was administered and identify N = 3,302 unique individuals who completed the CRT two or more times. We find a strong correlation between an individual’s first and last CRT performance, r = .806. This remains true even when constraining to data points separated by over 2 years, r = .755. Furthermore, we find that CRT scores from one timepoint correlated negatively with belief in God and social conservatism from the other timepoint (and to a similar extent as scores gathered at the same timepoint). These results show that CRT scores are stable over time, and – given the stable relationship between CRT and religious belief and ideology – provide some evidence for the stability of analytic cognitive style more generally.

Why are mistaken beliefs about COVID-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only part of the differences between people in their susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible to believing COVID-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US adult sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale that captures features of the current competing analyses of epistemic vice in the literature. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about COVID-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology.

Background: The integrative cognitive model of mood swings proposes that mood symptoms are driven by extreme, self-referent appraisals. For example, if activated mood is appraised positively, this prompts selection of mood regulation strategies that act to up-regulate mood. Appraisals are driven by fast and automatic Type 1 cognitive processes, which, left unchecked, can cause activated mood to escalate. Aims: It was hypothesized that greater propensity to override these automatic processes by engaging in reflective (Type 2) thinking would be negatively associated with extreme appraisals of activation and activation. Method: Study 1 (n = 150) was a cross-sectional survey consisting of measures of activation, extreme appraisals, and an objective performance-based measure of the propensity to engage in reflective thought (cognitive reflection test; CRT). In Study 2 (n = 241) participants completed these measures plus three alternative measures of effortful cognitive engagement (CRT-2, Need for Cognition and Actively Open-Minded Thinking). Results: In Study 1, propensity to engage in reflective thought (higher CRT scores) was not significantly associated with activated mood or extreme appraisals, but activated mood and extreme appraisals were positively correlated. In study 2, the association between activation and extreme appraisals was replicated. Predicted associations between alternative measures of reflective thinking, activated mood, and extreme appraisals were not found. Conclusions: Extreme appraisals of internal states may be a psychological mechanism underlying activated mood. Propensity to reflect on and override default cognitions was unrelated to these extreme appraisals and activated mood. Further research in a clinical sample using mood-relevant measures of reflective thinking is warranted.