This chapter examines the wide-ranging meaning of ‘government’ – and its four particular meanings – which are adopted for the purposes of this book. It also outlines the Comparator Jurisdictions which are selected for the purposes of the study of class action and government, viz: the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The chapter also introduces and describes the opt–out class actions which have been implemented in those various Comparator Jurisdictions.

This chapter examines the role of government as representative claimant, representing the class. The government may be a directly affected claimant, or may fulfill the role of an ‘ideological claimant’. This role may fall to a government regulator, most commonly. Difficult legal issues may arise where that representative claimant does not share a cause of action with the class members which it purports to represent, or seeks a remedy which is different from that which the class members are seeking. Much depends upon the level of precision (or lack thereof) with which the class action statute is designed.

This chapter examines the role of government as seed-funder of a class action regime. The typical model is to establish a fund that will be self-replenishing and independent of governmental funding as the regime establishes itself and as the case law gets underway. The best-known such model is Ontario’s Class Proceedings Fund, established in 1992, and this chapter examines the law and the practicalities pertaining to that particular fund. Many valuable experiences have been obtained from over a quarter of a century of jurisprudence arising from that Fund’s operation.

The chapter explores the notion of the government as a financial beneficiary of class actions litigation. Experiences derived from the Comparator Jurisdictions suggest that there are three ways in which a government may benefit, directly or somewhat more tangentially, from class actions litigation. Depending upon the way in which the relevant class actions statute is drafted, the government may benefit from escheat distributions of unclaimed damages; it may be a statutorily designated beneficiary of such unclaimed damages; or it may be a cy-pres beneficiary, where such an order is made by the court or by virtue of a judicially approved settlement agreement. Each of these has been rather controversial, and certainly quite disparately implemented, across the Comparator Jurisdictions.

This chapter considers the various ‘prompters’ which have been evident from around the Comparator Jurisdictions, as to why an opt–out class action was implemented, in addition to (or sometimes in place of) the collective redress regimes which existed prior to its enactment. There has been a remarkable degree of uniformity amongst those reasons, or ‘motivators’, for class actions law reform. These experiences convey lessons for those jurisdictions which may be minded to implement similar reforms.

This chapter concludes the comparative study which is undertaken in the book, by drawing together the various recommendations which have been made throughout the chapters, relating to the interplay between class actions and government. Whether preparing the path to the stadium, or being involved in the match as a litigant or beneficiary, the relationship between government and class actions is complex, sensitive, and quite fascinating.