This chapter applies Pragmatic Constructivism to interpret and assess two communities of practice: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which frames the problem of global warming, and the Conference of Parties (COP), which meets annually to discuss international society’s response within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Applying the book’s two normative tests – inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgment – the chapter demonstrates how the IPCC maintains epistemic authority by appropriately managing the boundary that separates expert knowledge from non-expert opinion. The analysis of COP operates at a micro level (e.g. how physical space at the Conference is organized) and the macro level (e.g. whether it would be better to organize deliberations on a ‘minilateral’ basis). The chapter notes how this debate has been bypassed by the Paris Agreement and the decision to commit to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for emissions reduction. It assesses the consequences of that collective judgement in light of the progress made at the 2021 Glasgow COP. The chapter concludes that the problem should now be framed in terms of states delivering on the commitments they have made, and it considers the usefulness of nationalist dispositions and citizens assemblies in that process.

In the penultimate chapter of the book, I explore the recent and attractive practice of “deliberative assemblies”. I maintain that the political crisis unleashed by “democratic erosion” (a crisis that was examined in the previous chapter) led to the creation of problem-solving alternatives that involve much more inclusive public discussion in places like Australia, Canada, Iceland, and Ireland, among several others. Through this chapter, I analyze these experiences and demonstrate that if the collective procedure is organized properly -even in the context of extremely numerous, plural, complex, multicultural, diverse, and conflictive societies- inclusive debate is possible and, above all, worthwhile.

Iceland has traditionally been recognized as a highly homogeneous, developed, and egalitarian country with a strong welfare state. In the mid-1990s, however, the local authorities became interested in the prevalent economic theories of those times favoring the “free market” over state intervention in the economy through “regulations.” Reforms in the financial market were introduced to liberalize the flow of capital, which ended up making the country’s banks and stock market attractive to investors, at least initially. For almost a decade, the country experienced an unexpected “boom” as foreign funds flooded in, which also left the country at the mercy of capital flux. As early as 2005, Iceland’s economy began showing alarming signs of weakness, including high levels of inflation and a sudden change in the flow of capital: almost overnight, capital began to flow out of the market, and quickly. Now a prisoner to foreign capital and its fluctuations, the economic “shock” was immediately felt: the national currency depreciated by 70 percent; the stock market crashed; and interest rates skyrocketed. By mid-October 2008, the downward spiral seemed uncontainable. Faced with the crisis, the government decided to assert control over the country’s three main private banks and declared the economy in a state of “bankruptcy.”