The picking and choosing among our intuitions that the author wants to criticize is found both in consequentialism and in Kantianism. The diversity of the roles of agency the consequentialist might concede is undoubtedly an intuitive phenomenon that confronts us. The clearest and most rational assessment method on the table is the one offered by consequentialism, which involves treating all agencies as if it had a productive role. This chapter deals with what Kant, the most systematic deontological theorist of all, has to say about the roles of agency. A philosophical or ethical outlook which did not insist, as Kant does, on the fundamental impregnability of causal determinism and of epistemological skepticism alike might have a number of advantages that Kant cannot duplicate. It might be less pessimistic about our prospects for doing science and causal explanation without marginalizing the possibility of agency.

The 'Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason' develops two distinctive conceptions of how freedom of choice and causal determinism may be reconciled. These two conceptions of freedom of choice correspond to a distinction between what Kant calls 'psychological' and what he calls 'transcendental freedom'. The Critical Elucidation presents the argument of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason as a kind of practical syllogism that highlights the distinctive contribution of pure practical reason and the complementary relation of the standpoints belonging to theoretical and pure practical reason. The pure practical concepts of morality involve principles of action that are independent of causal antecedents because they are based on the general principle of autonomy. Kant's fusion of incompatibilism and compatibilism needs to explain how one and the same action can be both caused by antecedent events and nevertheless be an action for which one can be held responsible.