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6 - Reasons and belief's justification
- By Clayton Littlejohn, University of Texas
Edited by Andrew Reisner, McGill University, Montréal, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Aarhus Universitet, Denmark
Book:

Reasons for Belief

Published online:

05 July 2011

Print publication:

02 June 2011, pp 111-130
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Summary

This chapter looks at some competing accounts of reasons and their demands. Some object to the conformity and compliance accounts on the grounds that they represent reasons as making unreasonable demands. The considerations that cause trouble for the conformity and compliance accounts suggest that normative appraisal is concerned with both the quality and results of the deliberative efforts. The chapter argues that there's something wrong with two influential approaches to epistemic justification. It focuses on evidentialism and the knowledge account because they face structurally similar problems. There's more to a belief's justification than the evidentialist maintains and less to a belief's justification than the knowledge account says. The problem with the evidentialist view is that it restricts the scope of epistemic evaluation to relations between a belief and the evidence an individual happens to have on hand.