This article considers the claim that miraculous healings are essential to present-day evangelization. I contrast this perspective with that of the Baroque scholastic theologian John Poinsot. Like his contemporaries, Poinsot is concerned with offering a robust defense of the Christian faith but is rather circumspect with respect to the role that the miraculous should play. I argue that Poinsot’s reasons are not only valid, but the positive framework he develops for defending the articles of the faith helps contemporary evangelists successfully navigate the pitfalls of postmodernity.

It is argued that Tertullian's relatively lengthy description of a chameleon in his De pallio serves as a metaphor not so much for the convert to a philosophical way of life in general but for the convert to Christianity in particular. The argument rests on the unusual emphases within this description which recall different features of Christianity or popular beliefs about the same.

This essay investigates one aspect of the relationship between contemporary apologetics and cultural studies. It begins with a consideration of Avery Dulles’ famous History of Apologetics. While noting the many virtues of Dulles’ work, it critiques his lack of attention to the role of imagination, emotion, narrative, and personal testimony. The essay argues that Dulles’ work shows how constricted the study of apologetics has often been in comparison with its practice. The essay goes on to note recent developments in research into apologetics which have begun to apply recent philosophical and theological interest in narrative, imagination, and the emotions to this field. It explores the increasingly sophisticated conceptual apparatus available for this task, in particular the concepts of the Social Imaginary and the Overton Window. Finally, the essay attempts a dialogue with certain aspects of secular advocacy, in relation to the role of emotion in the public square. It concludes that the use of conceptual resources from other disciplines, and engagement in dialogue with secular advocacy, may be of benefit to apologetics.

This article examines Karl Barth's engagement with the philosophy of religion of Ludwig Feuerbach. In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach proposes that religion is a function of human projection and that the Christian concept of God represents the crystallisation in one objectified subject of all the finite perfections of individual human beings. In Church Dogmatics, I/2, Barth seeks to respond to Feuerbach's critique of Christianity by affirming Feuerbach's critical account of the nature of religion but arguing that, since the original impetus of Christianity issues not from human projection but from God's act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ, Feuerbach's critique of religion does not apply to the Christian faith. Glasse notes that this response, whilst satisfactory to the Christian, would be ‘not intelligible’ to those who do not accept the Christian faith. Furthermore, Barth's apologetic manoeuvre, Vogel claims, entails that Barth is unable to defend the plausibility of the Christian faith on the terms set by secular culture, and that Christian theology is therefore required to abandon any attempt to participate constructively in general public discourse. Vogel recognises that this is a drastic recourse indeed, observing that it would be judicious for Christian theology to seek to elaborate a response to Feuerbach's critique which can stand without requiring the critic to assume the veracity of the Christian faith. This article argues that, by taking into account the role of Feuerbach's earlier work, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, for constituting the philosophical impetus of Feuerbach's critique of Christianity, the Christian theologian is able, using Barth's theological anthropology, to provide a response to Feuerbach's critique on Feuerbach's own terms. In Thoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach argues that Protestant Christianity, as the paradigmatic expression of religion, conceives the individual as an absolute being, and that, due to the fact that everyday existence clearly counter-indicates this absolutisation of the human individual, Protestantism posits a second, eternal life, in which the limits bound up with individual existence are eradicated. Using Barth's theological anthropology in Church Dogmatics, III/2 and III/4, this article proposes that Barth concurs with Feuerbach's critique of the absolutisation of the individual, but that he is positioned to deny that this absolutised conception of the individual has anything to do with the Christian faith insofar as he accurately represents it.

Apologists such as N.T. Wright, Gerald O’Collins, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, and Gary Habermas have appealed to the post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in the resurrection to lend credibility to Jesus’ resurrection. The earliest and most pertinent evidence concerning the earliest church's worship and devotional life has not been utilized to defend the resurrection (or to defend the historicity of the evidence itself).

On the other hand, scholars of early worship such as Richard Bauckham, Larry Hurtado, and James Dunn have not seen their work as having apologetic import. This essay seeks to bridge the gap between these research paradigms and show that they can only complement each other for the better, especially for the sake of apologetic purposes.

In an infamous passage in his Letter to the Galatians (2.11–14), Paul called out Peter as a ‘hypocrite’. This passage, especially when read in light of Paul's own appeal to himself as ‘all things to all people’ in 1 Cor 9.19–23, was to cause deep trouble for later Christian interpreters, who sought to defend their movement against charges from outsiders that it had a cracked and unstable foundation in dual ‘hypocrites’. This essay will introduce this ‘pagan’ critique and the cultural force it had, and the various solutions to the inherited dilemma from their scriptures that were offered by patristic authors (Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Jerome and Augustine). In light of this context, we turn to a sustained analysis of an untranslated homily by John Chrysostom, hom. in Gal 2.11 (In faciem ei restiti), which addresses not just the hypocrisy of Peter and Paul, but also the sticky problem of the hypocrisy of the Christian who reads this text approvingly as Paul's ‘in your face’ to Peter. Chrysostom does this by engaging in a convoluted pretence of his own.

Austin Farrer is highly praised but curiously under-read. Despite being recognized as ‘possibly the greatest Anglican mind of the 20th century,’ his influence in discussions of Anglican identity and theology is almost non-existent. As an attempt to remedy this deficit, this paper provides a sketch of Farrer's life and work, and then presents him as a specifically Anglican theologian through considering a sermon, a meditation on the Apostles' Creed, and a set of lectures to Oxford undergraduates. But presenting Farrer as ‘a specifically Anglican theologian’ is problematic if we cannot agree on the nature of Anglican theology. Therefore, the paper concludes by referencing a debate between Stephen Sykes and Paul Avis on this question, and asks if Farrer can function as a paradigm for contemporary Anglican theologians.

It is popular nowadays to claim not only that narrative is the most effective way to communicate religious knowledge but also that narrative provides the framework within which religious lifestyles and practices are meaningful. However, many today lack familiarity with the narratives of traditional religions. In other words, they suffer from ‘religious illiteracy’. This article considers the problem of how religion can become meaningful to such people. The view that religion can be divested of its outdated cultural accoutrements and presented in a form that resonates with postmodern secular culture is considered and found to be problematic. If acquiring a religion is like acquiring a culture, or a language, it seems unlikely that a deeper appreciation of a religious tradition will be facilitated by divesting it of its traditional cultural expressions. Moreover, the view that religious lifestyles should be emphasised rather than religious belief seems to be more a symptom of the problem of ‘religious illiteracy’ than a solution to it. The article concludes that both of these responses fail to provide a solution to the problem and that an alternative strategy is urgently required.

This article engages David Bentley Hart's critique of coercive “demonstration” in apologetics in favor of Gospel proclamation in the mode of “persuasion.” More specifically, I evaluate Hart's articulation of persuasion as a discourse that is primarily aesthetic and traffics primarily in beauty. After expressing an appreciation for Hart's critique of the traditional apologetics of demonstration, I suggest that Hart's own proposal still has elements of an “apologetic”—a kind of natural “aesthetic” theology, but a natural theology nonetheless. I conclude by extrapolating the Reformed critique of natural theology (based on the “noetic effects of sin”) to include a critique of Hart's aesthetic quasi‐natural theology by providing an account of the “affective” effects of sin.