Chapter 3 develops the information economy framework by invoking two additional resources: the concept of a speech-act from philosophy of language, and the concept of joint agency from action theory. The chapter also vindicates a prominent anti-reductionist theme: that the interpersonal relation of trust plays an essential role in testimonial knowledge. The central idea is that knowledge transmission essentially involves a kind of joint agency, characterized by a special sort of cooperation between speaker and hearer, and that joint agency essentially involves relations of trust between the cooperating agents. In addition, it is argued that the kind of joint agency involved in knowledge transmission essentially involves the speech-act of “telling.” The central idea is that a successful telling requires that the speaker intends to pass on knowledge to the hearer, and that the hearer understands that this is the speaker’s intention. It follows that a successful telling involves the kinds of “shared intention” and “common understanding” that are a characteristic of joint agency.

Chapter 1 begins by invoking an intuitive distinction between the generation of knowledge and the transmission of knowledge. Very roughly, generation concerns coming to know “for oneself,” as when one reasons to a conclusion on the basis of good evidence. Transmission concerns coming to know “from someone else,” as when one is told by someone else who knows. Section 1.1 argues that some but not all testimony is at the service of knowledge transmission, with the result that some but not all testimonial knowledge is transmitted knowledge. Section 1.2 redraws some familiar categories in the epistemology of testimony so as to better characterize our target and related phenomena, better frame our questions, and better see the possible answers. Finally, a central thesis of the book is introduced and discussed: that knowledge transmission is irreducible to knowledge generation, and for that reason requires its own theoretical treatment. More specifically, it is argued that an adequate account of transmission must go beyond the usual theoretical resources of traditional epistemology – that is, beyond those resources that the tradition uses to theorize knowledge generation.

Chapter 8 considers the widespread epistemic dependence that characterizes “big science,” and uses the information economy framework to dispel the worry that such dependence is inconsistent with the standards for scientific knowledge. This leads to a new argument against reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. First, reductionism is shown to be untenable for scientific knowledge.Second, if reductionism must be rejected for scientific knowledge, then it should be rejected more generally. This second idea can be vindicated in two ways. First, anti-reductionism about scientific knowledge entails anti-reductionism about knowledge in general, since anti-reductionism is best understood as the thesis that some transmitted knowledge cannot be reduced to generated knowledge. Second, if anti-reductionism is required for scientific knowledge, then reductionism for non-scientific knowledge is unmotivated. The most elegant position is anti-reductionism about knowledge transmission in general.

Chapter 2 introduces an “information economy” framework for approaching the epistemology of testimony. It is argued that, in a well-designed epistemic community, the norms governing information acquisition and information distribution will be different. This is because the dominant concern of information acquisition is quality control, whereas the dominant concern of information distribution is to provide access. The central idea, then, is to understand knowledge generation in terms of the norms governing information acquisition and to understand knowledge transmission in terms of the norms governing information distribution. The reason for adopting this approach is its explanatory power.In particular, the framework (a) explains a range of cases in the testimony literature; (b) provides a principled understanding of the transmission–generation distinction; and (c) explains the truth behind various and conflicting positions in the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, the framework nicely integrates with other plausible positions in epistemology, the philosophy of language, action theory, social science, and cognitive science.

Chapter 5 argues that the information economy framework can be wedded to a virtue-theoretic epistemology so as to yield a unified account of knowledge generation and knowledge transmission. The argument begins with the familiar virtue-theoretic idea that knowledge is a kind of success from virtuous or competent agency, as opposed to a mere lucky success.Knowledge is an achievement in that sense. But now we draw a distinction between the competent agency of an individual and the competent joint agency of two individuals acting together. The argument, then, is that knowledge generation is to be understood in terms of success due to the competent agency of the knower. Knowledge transmission is to be understood in terms of success due to the competent joint agency of speaker and hearer acting together. The same argument is used to address the most persistent and pressing objection to virtue epistemology – that it cannot give an adequate account of testimonial knowledge, and that, more generally, virtue epistemology is overly individualistic.