Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 5 - Wittgenstein’s Naturalism and the Skeptical Paradox

  • Edited by Claudine Verheggen, York University, Toronto
  • Book:
    Kripke's <i>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language</i> at 40
    Published online:
    22 February 2024
    Print publication:
    08 February 2024, pp 87-106

  • Summary

    There is a form of naturalism which runs through Kripke’s account of rule-following. Given the overarching structure of his account, in which Wittgenstein’s naturalism is made to serve the ends of a skeptical solution to the paradox of the regress of interpretations, it inevitably has the effect of giving a reductive interpretation of it. The reductionist aspect was made clear by those, such as Crispin Wright, who made Kripke’s naturalistic element explicit, using non-normative notions in a constructive account of what going by a rule consists in. I look at Wittgenstein’s pivot toward naturalism in the early 1930s and trace its development to the discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue for a different understanding of Wittgenstein’s naturalism and its relation to the paradox of PI §201, one which allows it to escape the charges of both reductionism and an unsatisfactory form of quietism.