This chapter sets the programme for building up a metaethics of belief from the unexplored angle of motivation. It introduces and transposes to epistemology three standard metaethical debates, internalism versus externalism about the connection between moral judgements and motivation; Humeanism versus anti-Humeanism about the nature of motivation; and cognitivism versus non-cognitivism about moral judgements. The chapter shows how the position on motivation affects the commitments in the higher, more metaphysical, realms of our metaethics of belief: in particular, it makes cognitivism about epistemic judgements prima facie plausible. It shows that loftier metaethical questions can be answered from a stance on motivation. As far as motivation goes, then, our metaethics of belief should be anti-Humean about the nature of epistemic motivation, and internalist about how epistemic judgements motivate us. Methodologically, the kind in question is one which builds itself up from theoretically lower-level commitments concerning motivation.