One health suggests that human and animal health are comparable, but in practice, the concept aligns with the principles of public health ethics. One health ethics, as such, appears to eschew connotations of equality for the natural world. A theory of agency revises that anthropocentric assumption. This article begins with a critique of environmental dualism: the idea that human culture and nature are separate social realms, thus justifying public health as a (unifying) purpose. In response, this article argues that, first, a neuroethics of one health might equally regard humans and (some) animals, which have comparable mental states, as rational agents. Second, rational agency should ground our moral connections to nature in terms of the egalitarian interests we have (as coinhabitants) in the health of the planet. While this article makes a moderate case for interspecific rights (as the first argument asserts), neuroscience is unlikely for now to change how most public institutions regard nonhuman animals in practice. However, the second argument asserts that rational agency is also grounds for philosophical environmentalism. One health ethics, therefore, is a theory of equality and connects culture to nature, and, as such, is a separate, but coextensive approach to that of public health.

This article has three sections, covering three themes in CST. In the first I sketch out the development of an integral humanistic approach and then go on to suggest that the ‘flip’ side of this is an unduly anthropocentric stance on ecological issues by Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict. In the second section I give an account of official Catholic teaching on justice for women and their equality with men. I suggest that over the past fifty years there have been major advances on this issue. But John Paul's concept of the complementarity of women and men raises great difficulties—particularly insofar as it is used as one of the main justifications for Vatican insistence that the Church does not have the authority to ordain women. In the third section I examine Vatican views on the appropriate means which Church authorities and the Church membership should use in working to promote justice. Should Church leaders limit themselves to clarifying the nature of authentic development, pointing out various forms of injustice, calling for change, and suggesting an alternative ‘economy of communion’? May they ever go further than such ‘education of consciences’, by encouraging the poor to struggle for justice, and by themselves confronting oppressive governments?