Aztec rulers, Mexica and others, used their authority to develop, expand, and defend the Excan tlatoloyan and other confederations in or near the Basin of Mexico. That region contained about sixty political units, each called an altepetl. The largest, most militarily and economically powerful was Tenochtitlan, the Mexica capital city. The most common translations, city-state or kingdom, capture something essential. They had urban cores, and they were each ruled by supreme rulers, the tlatoani. As important as the altepetl was, localities that constituted them, known as tlaxilacalli or calpolli, smaller units that in many ways constituted communities unto themselves, were also important. Violence was a key part of Aztec political culture and state and confederation building in the late Postclassic period. War practices relied upon structure and discipline, weaponry, the pursuit of captives, and the vanquishing of enemies who produced material wealth in the form of everyday and luxury items paid as tribute to the imperial powers. Whether through elite marriages or wars, inter-altepetl relations took place within a context in which the Excan tlatoloyan sought aggressively to enlarge its domain of control by becoming an expansive confederation that can be considered a hegemonic empire.

The chapter traces the rise from the distant pre-contact past of the modified lake environment through the Post-Classic Period when the Native American peoples founded their altepetl, or city-states, until their conquest first by the Aztec Triple Alliance and then by Spaniards. The chapter covers the Spanish--Mexica War and demonstrates that it had vital a hydraulic dimension. While the siege of Tenochtitlan has long been understood as a naval battle, the analysis presented here follows the precedent of the New Conquest History in underscoring the contributions of Nahuas to the outcome of the conflict, particularly when it came to specialist knowledge of the Basin of Mexico’s hydrology and strategic efforts to defeat the enemies by turning the engineering works against them. The chapter concludes by tracing continuities into the mid-sixteenth century, especially with the survival of the altepetl and its foundation for colonial-era jurisdictions, including that of the cabildo, or town council, which Nahuas readily adopted and made their own. In so doing, they preserved control over the water management system even as they adapted to new colonial realities.

In the late-sixteenth century, a spate of violent incidents brought disrepute upon the mission enterprise in New Spain.Spanish churchmen lamented that some of their peers were inciting natives to disobey, resist, and even burn the churches of their ecclesiastical rivals.Spaniards spilled much ink in reporting these unseemly clashes in their correspondence and chronicles.Less reported are the many similar confrontations that occurred simultaneously in indigenous communities.Such was the worldly power of the mission enterprise that those Spanish churchmen and native rulers who did not have access to it jostled, often violently, to possess it.This chapter situates these curious episodes in the broader context of a series of political crises that shook the mendicant-indigenous mission enterprise to its very foundations in the 1570s and 1580s.It examines the politics of secularization, conflicts among indigenous jurisdictions for control of the mission Church, and the many points of cross-influence between Spanish and indigenous rivalries.As a result this chapter finds a mission enterprise that began to decline not solely due to Spanish political changes that undercut mendicant power, but rather because this weakening of mendicant power in the Spanish realm interacted with the on-going fragmentation and atomization of indigenous polities.

This chapter presents an alternative to the standard narrative of the decline of the mission enterprise, which tends to focus exclusively on Spanish politics.The chapter argues that a series of catastrophic demographic crises ultimately marked the definitive end of mendicant expansion.At least forty percent of the indigenous population perished between 1575 and 1595.In many areas, the population fell below the critical levels necessary for the mission enterprise to remain economically and socially sustainable.The civil records of the viceroyalty show the results: stalling construction projects, diminishing tributes, and declining workforces. Communities had once committed to raising doctrina monasteries now reported widespread starvation and lamented that their workforces could no longer sustain the Church.Thus, while earlier crises wrought by conquests and epidemics had seen vigorous recovery efforts that stimulated the construction and expansion of the mission enterprise, late-sixteenth century demographic crises rendered the mission unsustainable for a rising number of communities.This late-century crisis opened a new phase in the history of the mission enterprise, in which mendicants curtailed once-ambitious construction campaigns, downsized the scale and extent of their operations, and halted the expansion of the enterprise.Friars and native rulers turned to defending the infrastructure that earlier generations had built, and many of these jurisdictions came to serve as centers for concentrating outlying populations in the congregaciones of the early seventeenth century.

In the late-sixteenth century, a spate of violent incidents brought disrepute upon the mission enterprise in New Spain.Spanish churchmen lamented that some of their peers were inciting natives to disobey, resist, and even burn the churches of their ecclesiastical rivals.Spaniards spilled much ink in reporting these unseemly clashes in their correspondence and chronicles.Less reported are the many similar confrontations that occurred simultaneously in indigenous communities.Such was the worldly power of the mission enterprise that those Spanish churchmen and native rulers who did not have access to it jostled, often violently, to possess it.This chapter situates these curious episodes in the broader context of a series of political crises that shook the mendicant-indigenous mission enterprise to its very foundations in the 1570s and 1580s.It examines the politics of secularization, conflicts among indigenous jurisdictions for control of the mission Church, and the many points of cross-influence between Spanish and indigenous rivalries.As a result this chapter finds a mission enterprise that began to decline not solely due to Spanish political changes that undercut mendicant power, but rather because this weakening of mendicant power in the Spanish realm interacted with the on-going fragmentation and atomization of indigenous polities.

This chapter examines the interdependent relationships between indigenous rulers and missionaries between 1530 and 1560. From its very beginnings, the mission in New Spain was a hybrid enterprise. Native territorial politics and everyday practices of governance largely determined the shape of mission organization. The chapter begins by examining the political foundation of the mission enterprise, which consisted of an expanding web of local native-missionary alliances.The mission was a vital factor in the geopolitical reshuffling of territorial power in post-conquest Mesoamerica, while indigenous territorial divisions served as the basis for the mission system of doctrinas (mission bases) and visitas (outlying mission churches). The chapter then examines the ways in which these alliances of missionaries and native governments adapted pre-conquest political and religious offices to the needs of the mission enterprise.In hundreds of doctrinas (mission bases), officials known collectively as the teopantlaca, or “church-people” – indigenous fiscales (church officers), alguaciles de doctrina (church constables), and cantores and trompeteros (singers and musicians) – oversaw the everyday experience of the mission. By adapting native hierarchical structures, territoriality, and officialdom to the mission enterprise, native rulers and missionaries furthered their respective efforts to reassert local indigenous authority and expand the mission’s doctrinal program.

This chapter examines the interdependent relationships between indigenous rulers and missionaries between 1530 and 1560. From its very beginnings, the mission in New Spain was a hybrid enterprise. Native territorial politics and everyday practices of governance largely determined the shape of mission organization. The chapter begins by examining the political foundation of the mission enterprise, which consisted of an expanding web of local native-missionary alliances.The mission was a vital factor in the geopolitical reshuffling of territorial power in post-conquest Mesoamerica, while indigenous territorial divisions served as the basis for the mission system of doctrinas (mission bases) and visitas (outlying mission churches). The chapter then examines the ways in which these alliances of missionaries and native governments adapted pre-conquest political and religious offices to the needs of the mission enterprise.In hundreds of doctrinas (mission bases), officials known collectively as the teopantlaca, or “church-people” – indigenous fiscales (church officers), alguaciles de doctrina (church constables), and cantores and trompeteros (singers and musicians) – oversaw the everyday experience of the mission. By adapting native hierarchical structures, territoriality, and officialdom to the mission enterprise, native rulers and missionaries furthered their respective efforts to reassert local indigenous authority and expand the mission’s doctrinal program.

This chapter examines the social and political history of the construction of the most significant physical monuments produced in the Mexican mission: a network of 251 monasteries, which I refer to as doctrina monasteries.While scholars have examined these structures in terms of architectural and art history, the social history of these monasteries remains neglected. I argue that these monumental building campaigns formed part of indigenous efforts to reconstitute communities in the wake of the severe disruptions caused by the hueycocolixtli epidemic of 1545-1547.Remarkably, in the decade after losing a third of their population, the number of indigenous communities that decided to build large monasteries more than doubled, from 43 to 119 large-scale projects.For indigenous rulers, monastery construction served as a highly visible means of reasserting political power.As a replacement for the teocalli (Mesoamerican temple), the doctrina monastery came to represent the sovereignty of the local native state.Moreover, the process of producing the monastery employed indigenous mechanisms of tribute and obligatory labor that reinforced rulers’ claims over outlying territories and peoples. Nonetheless, labor and tribute were not automatic mechanisms.Instead, the mobilization of labor and tributes were governed by expectations of reciprocity that bound rulers to commoners.Archival evidence reveals the frailty of such arrangements. As ongoing demographic crises strained the social contract, resistance to building campaigns intensified.Thus, these colossal structures embodied aspirations that ultimately were far more fragile than the stone and mortar of these structures’ hulking walls.